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PREFACE
The research and writing of this paper were conducted
and completed prior to the 26 Party Congress of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1981. As a result,
information and insights gained from that event have not been
considered. Additionally, the conference on Soviet Decision-
making held at the Naval Postgraduate in the fall of 1980,
while coming after the completion of this paper, served to
reinforce and support certain hypotheses profered herein.
Through personal interviews and discussions during the course
of that conference, substantive academic credence was lent
to both the methodology and conclusions reached.

INTRODUCTION
With the Revolution, and likewise Soviet domestic politics
now almost 63 years old, it is essential to the study to en-
capsulate the evolutionary trends . This is particularly
important given the possibility that Brezhnev's health is
such that he could die at almost any moment. Additionally,
it has become a given that the Soviet Union, in almost all
categories, is a vastly different society and system than
that inherited from Lenin in 1924
.
Clearly, the most readily perceived systemic change can
be easily described as societal and political maturization
.
In the 1920' s, the forces operating within the system were
channeled toward the most basic political and human element;
survival. As a result, the responses to outside threats were
designed to neutralize them as much as possible. Life threat-
ening, in the political sense, circumstances were countered
by programs, policies and techniques engineered, however
crudely, to counter the threats and maintain, if not increase,
the vitality of the system.
Stalin's packing of the party ranks with politically un-
sophisticated ruffians and his subsequent use of these groups
at Party Congresses would be impossible within the Soviet
political system today. Additionally, his drastic indus-
trialization and collectivization programs paralleled by the
generation of powerful coercive levers and the subsequent use

of those levers would be impossible to initiate within the
system as it exists today. This is not to say that the soci-
ety as a whole would not allow it, but that the Soviet elite
would quash such extremism before it threatened their recently
acquired political and social status.
While these rather diabolical aspects of the Soviet poli-
tical scene have become extinct—or at least dominant—as
operating variables within the present system, certain other
variables, born during the same period of political immaturity,
have flourished. The most significant systemic variable in
the power equation has been the evolution of the party apparat-
us. Lenin developed the embryo of a disciplined party cadre
with which to gain and maintain political control, but it was
Stalin who codified the system and developed the smooth run-
ning "transmission belts" that came to control all aspects of
Soviet economic and political life.
It was also Stalin who developed an economic model for
the Soviet Union that has dogged it to the present and has
skewed the resources of the society toward the development
of powerful interest groups. That the military was a power-
ful political force from the outset is underscored by recalling
its part in the revolution and the fact that it represented a
major base of support for Trotsky. Stalin, by declaring that
the policy of the country was directly linked with its heavy
industrial capability, hence, its military strength, created
a system bias. This bias translated into the coopting of the
very best Soviet resources to that sector and created a
8

self-perpetuating preferred pattern for those resources that
could only result in an extremely powerful political force.
The extent of this force will be analyzed in depth later.
Finally, a certain political modus operandi that was
first developed during the Lenin succession has been refined
and nurtured into its present form. The first of these poli-
tical facts of life is the existence and import of factional-
ism within the power elite. Although Lenin's political
philosophy absolutely denied the existence of such a variable
within the system, human ambitions and politics made differ-
ences inevitable. The key to success in Soviet politics seems
to be to read the political wind and to always be aligned with
the winning side
.
The second evolutionary operational code deals with reac-
tionism. Each new regime, i.e., the winning coalition, has
initially pursued a series of policies designed to reverse
the more "unsavory" programs of its predecessor. There are,
to be sure, certain continuities that have not seriously been
affected (at least in the long run) by these revisions. Clearly,
however, "socialism in one country" was a reaction to the per-
ceived danger to the system of the continuation of "world
revolution" and the "new economic policy" as political programs.
Also, quite obviously, the de-Stalinization program was a reac-
tion to the threat posed by the continuation of political ter-
ror as a system variable. Finally, stability, sobriety and
the maintenance of the status quo are the present reactionary

policies pursued as a consequence of the excesses to the
Khrushchev era.
Under Khrushchev, many of the political and economic
variables operative during the rise and consolidation of
Stalin continued to be extremely important and distinctive
in Soviet power politics. The Party, always a key element
with respect to legitimacy and control, became more than a
mere one-way "transmission belt." In particular the top
organs of the Party enjoyed an increase in significance and
were able to function, albeit with no minor amount of con-
straints, as an integral part of the deci si on-making operation
This is most clearly evident in Khrushchev's extraordinary
use of the Central Committee in 1957.
As the fortunes of the Party as a viable political force
grew under Khrushchev, so too did the power of the military-
industrial complex. As we shall see, Malenkov chose the Sovi-
et consumer as the group to protect in his early post-Stalin
face-off with Khrushchev. Twenty-five years of Stalinism,
however, had done little to enhance the position of the masses
as a political force and had, in fact, drastically inhibited
their growth in this area. Conversely, the same period had
been marked by major advances in Soviet heavy industry and,
as a result of the war, the military. These two elements of
Soviet society had defeated the Hitlerites and saved Mother
Russia; a fact that had significantly enhanced their political
significance vis-a-vis all other groups. Khrushchev's initial
10

support for this combined force established a pattern for
power consolidation that has remained to the present.
The Stalin succession did lead to a reduction in the
status of one "power lever" that had significant implications.
By the late 1930' s, the secret police had evolved to a posi-
tion within Soviet society such that they were perhaps the
most powerful force within the system. That this power was
coercive and threatening led to the unification of the opposi-
tion to the secret police following the death of its chief
benefactor, Stalin. Although the KGB remains a powerful
political variable within present Soviet society (as demon-
strated by its representation in the Politburo) , its signi-
ficance has been reduced to that of a major contributing ele-
ment to the larger military-industrial group.
The role of the government structure as a seat of politi-
cal power was reduced following Stalin's death. Although it
had never been an influential part of Soviet politics, Stalin
had enhanced its position in relation to the party during the
later stages of his regime. That Malenkov chose this base
from which to launch his bid and failed in the attempt, greatly
elevated the status of the party vis-a-vis the government.
The political fortunes of Kosygin clearly suggest that this
relationship has survived to the present.
By 1964, Soviet society and politics had matured to such
an extent that Khrushchev's unsophisticated political style
was intolerable. Significantly, this maturization was largely
a result of Khrushchev's own initiatives but he failed to grow
11

with the rest of the system. Perhaps it was too much to ex-
pect from one whose formative years were spent under one of
the crudest political systems imaginable. But just as
Khrushchev had not developed, Brezhnev represented a new
class of Soviet politician.
Typically, Brezhnev followed many of the established rules
in consolidating his position. He pursued a policy line that
reversed the excesses of the previous regime and supported
the most influential interest groups. As a result, the role
of the Party was enhanced still further, to the point that
it is clearly predominant within the system. However, the
rise of the party's political fortunes has not been accom-
plished without a price. Under Brezhnev's tutelage, there
has been a decided increase in careerism that may significantly
impact on the future policies and programs of the state. This
careerism is additionally associated with the rising influence
of the most powerful interest group in present day Soviet
society, the military-industrial complex. The combination
of career-oriented party professionals and the continued in-
crease in the political power of the defnese related consti-
tuency represents the single most important variable in the
immediate Soviet domestic political future. It is from this
group that the policies and programs of the 1980 's and beyond
will most likely be formulated.
Finally, system maturization has resulted in the estab-
lishment of oligarchy, or perhaps "limited personal rule,"
and the exclusion of dictatorship as a reasonable alternative.
12

Brezhnev's style as a consensus politician, coupled with the
fact that he has survived and enhanced his own position, has
provided an excellent model for future aspirants to the top
position. This is particularly true in light of the fact
that the last of the revolutionaries have long since passed
from the Soviet political scene taking ideological dynamism
with them.

I. THE LENINIST UNDERPINNING
Political succession in the Soviet Union is an histori-
cally unique phenomenon in that communism, the ideology and
the practical application, have no precedent. Within Soviet
communist society there are certain variables that have be-
come distinguishable over time as being important factors
that contribute to the power of the leadership. These varia-
bles seem to become highlighted during periods of leadership
transition and therefore become more recognizable and veri-
fiable. Through a comparative case study of past transition
periods it is possible to determined the potential causal re-
lationship between the various independent variables and the
eventual outcome of the struggle. It is not the presumption
of this study to categorically determine the exact relation-
ship, but rather to suggest a loose conceptual framework within
which to examine contemporary Soviet political dynamics.
In the 63 years that the Soviet Union has been in existence
there have been a total of four individuals that have earned
the title of dominant leader. Any study, even a cursory one,
reveals several characteristics that have continued to surface
as a feature of the men and their system. Perhaps the most
significant and apparent are those characteristics of politi-
cal pragmatism and unequivocable ruthlessness . These traits,
noticable in any successful politician, take on a uniqueness
all their own in the Soviet system. A brief look at the first
14

succession in Soviet history, that of Lenin, may help in
explaining this phenomenon.
Why Lenin? While this is an important question, it will
not be sufficient to simply answer this one question as
there are a variety of other variables surrounding the causes
of communist rule in Russia. For that matter, one must also
ask, why the revolution? The answer is both simple and
complex.
The Romanov dynasty had been in serious difficulty for
many years and had not displayed much introspection or de-
sire to do so, as to the reasons for its sorry state. The
1905 Revolution would have, one would think, shaken even the
most inane autocrat to take the steps necessary to save his
head. Instead, a grand bluff, the Duma, was organized in a
shallow attempt to fool the intelligentsia. With the Tsar in
command of the army in the war against the Germans, and the
Tsarina, under the influence of the absurd Rasputin, the game
was finished. Just about all of the Russian intelligentsia had
come to the conclusion that the old system must go and some-
thing new had to be instigated. With that conclusion, both
the problem and the solution were exposed.
For the grand dukes, the generals and admirals, the schol-
ars and the intelligentsia, the need for a radical change was
clear, but what form the change should take was clear only
to one member of this group. To him, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov
Lenin, the solution was crystal clear and had been for years.
His solution was simply to win.
15

The fact that Lenin was a Marxist was important in terms
of his succession and with respect to the legacy he left his
country, but it was not the reason that he became the leader
of the new Soviet state, nor has it been the reason for any
successful Soviet political ascension. Lenin, as have been
his successors , was a pure revolutionary pragmatist who found
an ideology that justified his intuitive feelings about the
state of Russian society in addition to "scientifically"
proving that he would get what he wanted if he worked things
right. When the revolution came, he was ready when no one
else was even close.
As early as 1902 Lenin was concerning himself with the
mechanics necessary to bring about a successful revolution.
At that time he wrote, "...the organization of revolution-
ists must be comprised first and foremost of people whose
profession is that of revolutionists .. .all distinctions as
between workers and intellectuals, and certainly distinction
of trade and professions, must be dropped. Such an organi-
zation must, of necessity, be not too extensive and as secret
2
as possible." The disorganized intellectuals that assumed
control of the country following the Tsar's abdication never
had a chance in the face of Lenin's highly disciplined, pro-
fessional revolutionaries. But Lenin was not satisfied with
a small, elite revolutionary Party for which "...outright
3
military discipline (was) indispensible ; " he demanded more
of his followers, he demanded "democratic centralism." "The
main principle of democratic centralism is that of the higher
16

cell being elected by the lower cell, the absolute binding
force of all directives of a higher cell for a cell subordi-
nate to it, and the existence of a commanding party centre
(whose authority is) indisputable for all leaders in party
4life." With this tool, his own boundless energy and self-
righteousness, and Marxist justification that enabled him to
say that, "...everything that is done in the proletarian cause
is honest," he connived, manipulated and forced his way into
the leadership of the revolution, which in turn ordained him
with the single most important element, heretofore missing
in the eyes of the majority of the populace, legitimacy.
Unfortunately for his successors, the mantle of "revolution-
ary leader" could only apply to one man, and therefore the
problem of legitimacy has dogged Soviet political leaders
since. Additionally, Lenin's political legacy, with its crass
opportunism, militaristic discipline, and sometimes blatant
disregard for the masses has served to compound the problem
of political legitimacy in a society of increasing, albeit
regulated, literacy and political savvy. It was this very
problem that concerned the five man Party Politburo in 1922
when Lenin suffered his first stroke and two years later, in
January 19 24, it was still unresolved.
Curiously, and although far from legitimate, it became
clear that long before Lenin's death and at first without his
apparent knowledge, ...."Russian society already lived under
Stalin's rule, without being aware of the ruler's name.




positions of power by his rivals." From the standpoint of
Soviet politics, particularly those concerning leadership
succession, it is of paramount importance to analyze what
this meant and how it came about.
From the standpoint of future comparisons it is important
to trace Stalin's political biography after the revolution
and parallel it with the evolution of Soviet political power
and processes from the revolution to Lenin's death. A com-
plete and clear appreciation of communist political institu-
tions is essential to the understanding of the levers of power
which must be manipulated during a successful political career
The significance of this is further underscored by the rather
unsavory results should one pull a lever too hard and lose
the struggle.
Perhaps the best and most complete description of the
arrangement of early Soviet political institutions is offered
by Isaac Deutscher:
From the beginning of the civil war the Polit-
bureau acted as the party's brain and supreme
authority although the party statutes contained no
provision even for its existence. The annual con-
gresses elected only a Central Committee which was
endowed with the widest powers of determining
policy and managing the organization and was ac-
countable to the next congress. The Central Com-
mittee elected the Politbureau. At first, the
Politbureau was to take decisions only on urgent
matters arising during the weekly or fortnightly
intervals between the sessions of the Central
Committee. Then, as the scope of the affairs with
which that Committee had to deal widened, includ-
ing more and more of the business of government,
and as the members of the Committee became in-
creasingly absorbed in manifold departmental respon-
sibilities and were often absent from Moscow, the
Central Committee gradually and informally delegated
18

some of its prerogatives to the Politbureau. The
Central Committee once consisted only of a dozen
or so members; but then it became too big and
cumbersome to act effectively. In 1922 it met
only once in two months, while the members of
the Politbureau worked in close day-to-day con-
tact. In their work they adhered strictly to
democratic procedure. Where differences of
opinion were marked, they decided by a simple
majority. It was within this framework, as
primus inter pares , that Lenin exercised supreme
power. 7 ^
Within this framework, Stalin was to hold three key posi-
tions directly following the civil war, which were to prove
extremely beneficial from the standpoint of providing a
political base of support and for the beginnings of his
accumulation of power. These positions were the Commissar
of Nationalities, the Commissar of the Workers 1 and Peasants'
gInspectorate, and a member of the Politburo. It appears
to be generally conceded that Stalin was able to directly
benefit from these job assignments by his use of political
appointments and the knowledge he gained concerning the
innermost workings of the Party machine . But what is not
clear is whether Stalin knew what he was doing from the outset
or whether he learned through serendipity the extent of power
that he could potentially realize. That Stalin was a realist
and a pragmatist is unquestionable, but he was not considered
a great intellect by his contemporaries within the Politburo
and it was certainly not his ideological writings that enabled
him to gain the leadership of the country. Perhaps it is ex-
planation enough to say that he was the best politican of the
group and as such intuitively felt the potentialities for
19

power aggrandizement that were placed in his hands by virtue
of his political appointments. There are interesting repe-
titions of this theme throughout the history of Soviet
politics, particularly in terms of leadership succession.
Regardless of whether the jobs made Stalin or Stalin made
the jobs, his association with the Commissariat of the Nation-
alities enabled him to appoint a loyal political constituency
in the hinterlands that would be absolutely essential later.
His appointment as head of the Inspectorate was the next
important phase of his education in machine politics and
conversely, in the education by Stalin of the Soviet system
of power processes.
Lenin had become dismayed by a traditional Russian insti-
tutional problem that had dogged that society for years
—
namely, the insidious appearance of the "petty bureaucrat."
To counter this trend he instituted in 1919 the Commissariat
of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate to infiltrate and
operate at every level of the government. Additionally, this
reorganization was to exist totally without the normal govern-
9
mental institutions acting as "a sort of super-government."
The appointment of Stalin to head this organization is fas-
cinating for it sheds some light on how he was viewed by
Lenin at the time. Lenin was anything but politically naive
and Stalin's appointment suggests that not only was Lenin
confident in Stalin's ability to do the job, but that for all
Stalin's aggressiveness, he was perhaps intellectually and
politically unthreatening at this point. As we shall see,
20

Lenin drastically changed his mind later concerning Stalin's
potential. What is most significant about the appointment,
however, is what the direct benefits were to Stalin in terms
of his continuing political education and the enlargement
of his supportive constituency. The Inspectorate enabled
him to become intimately familiar with the machinery of the
new Soviet system that was developing, more familiar than
Lenin himself, or anyone else for that matter. This co-
development of the system and the man are essential in assess-
ing the reasons for Stalin's rise to power.
But the Inspectorate was only one of the educational tools
afforded Stalin. In addition, Stalin had been an original
member of the Politburo whose operation was described earlier.
Further, he was in charge of another seemingly secondary of-
fice, the Organization Bureau or Orgbureau. "At the... Eighth
Party Congress the Organizational Bureau, likewise of five
members (as the Politburo) was created. Its function was
personnel work— the appointment and removal of Party members
to and from jobs--with the approval of the Politburo. However,
at the following Party Congress .... the Orgburo was accorded
the right to independently, without the sanction of the
Politburo decide questions of an organizational character and
questions of personnel .. .Stalin was the only original member
of both." (Emphasis added.) That Stalin was appointed
this duty seems again to underscore the managerial status
that he represented rather than his political expertise.
Furthermore, as Deutscher points out, "like none of his
21

colleagues, he was immersed in the party's daily drudgery
and in all its kitchen cabals." Just as the Inspectorate
provided experience and education in the governmental struc-
ture and system, the job as head of the Orgburo provided the
identical benefits in the Communist Party apparatus. As
the Orgburo was responsible for all personnel appointments
within the party, Stalin again was able to establish a re-
sponsive and loyal party constituency to coincide with that
of the civil service and the nationalities. The potential
for power aggrandizement is staggering for a lesser man, but
for Stalin it is unbelievable. "At this stage his power was
already formidable. Still more was to accrue to him from
his appointment, on 3 April, 19 22, to the post of General
12Secretary of the Central Committee." It is, however, impor-
tant to keep this appointment, and the other jobs he had held
or presently held, in perspective with the times. Lenin was
still alive and very much in control, and all of the jobs
Stalin held were associated with the need for a good clerk
or managerial technician. In Lenin's mind the party secre-
taryship was a technician's office .. .strictly an executor of
13the will of the Central Committee." Time had not eroded
the importance if incisive ideological brilliance and it was
this characteristic in which Lenin held such a commanding
lead, that was considered the most important legitimizing
aspect of Soviet leadership. After all, they were revolu-
tionaries , not politicians , and any association as such would
have been considered a liability. Unfortunately for Lenin and
22

the other members of the Politburo save Stalin, the lack of
current Soviet political expertise at the expense of revolu-
tionary fervor, turned out not to be the real liability.
On May 22, 19 22 Lenin suffered his first stroke and al-
though he was to recover briefly in the fall to return to
some degree of active control, he was destined never to
14
regain his former position of absolute control. From this
day, the question of succession was first raised, if not im-
mediately in the mind of Lenin, at least in those of his
subordinates. From the outset, "the only conceivable suc-
cession to Lenin, temporarily ill or definitely removed, was
15
a directory of the top Party leaders..." Hence, the stage
was set for the beginnings of what has come to be known as
"collective leadership" in the Soviet Union and the first,
post-revolution factional dog fight among the top Party
leadership. Modern Soviet politics was born in the ensuing
years of struggle.
THE PRINCIPLES
In May, 19 22 the top Soviet leadership, the Politburo,
stood at seven full members and three candidates . The full
members were; Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev,
Rykov and Thomsky . The candidate members were Bukharin,
Kalimin and Molotov. Of these, Lenin was unquestionably
primus inter pares but had by no means assumed the role of
"I c
absolute dictator. The question of who came next on the
power ladder is somewhat more blurred but as we have already
23

seen, Stalin had the inside track on the party and govern-
mental system. However, in the world of 1922 Soviet Russia,
Stalin, although holding in his hands what were to become
the keys to leadership ascension, was not recognized by the
masses and his contemporaries within the Politburo as a
great revolutionary ideologue and leader. That symbolic title
was clearly associated, after Lenin, with two men, Leon
Trotsky and perhaps to a lesser extent, G. Zinoviev. "The
withdrawal of Lenin at once threw into relief the potential
rivalry between Trotsky and Zinoviev, the two most obvious
17
candidates for the succession..." Unfortunately for
Trotsky, he was perhaps more obvious than his immediate rival
and therefore constituted the greatest threat to the others.
This fact, the result of Trotsky's unparalleled success as
head of the Red Army and his ideological genius, had won for
him universal leader recognition within Soviet Russia.
But within the leadership, Trotsky depended and owed much
of his support to Lenin, in much the same way that a desig-
nated heir apparent owes his position to his designator.
With Lenin out of the active arena and the issue of his return
at least in doubt, Trotsky appeared to be the one to beat in
order to assume control of the reins of the government. The
stage was set for the beginnings of an inter-party factional
battle which was to establish the basis for the political
parameters of winning and losing within the Soviet system
for years to come.
24

Another problem concerning the succession of Lenin was
directly related to Lenin's official position within the
Party-State structure. Put quite simply, he had no all-
encompassing official position or title (although he was
Chairman of the Council of Commissars) and was the leader
of the country simply because he was Lenin, the great hero
and leader of the revolution. The problem, a recurrent one
in Soviet succession politics, was which, Party or State,
an ambitious individual should strive to gain control.
Zinoviev was the head of the Communist International and
Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. He was an impressive
individual for a number of reasons. He has been described
as "one of the revolution's giants" and as being "attracted
by bold ideas." Additionally, he was a great orator and was
said to have a "grip on the imagination of Russian crowds
18(that) was .. .demonic. " He had been with Lenin from almost
the beginning and therefore could lay claim to being a mem-
ber of the "Old Guard." Unfortunately, Zinoviev had two
handicaps in his bid for power. The first was his (and
Kamenev's) well known opposition to Lenin in 1917 over the
issue of the timing for the revolution, and the second and
perhaps most damaging in terms of the dynamics of the situa-
tion in 19 24 Russia was that "his will was weak, vacillating,
19
and even cowardly .
"
Kamenev led the Moscow Soviet, a powerful governmental
position but a very weak base from which to spring into con-




ambition. Trotsky held no position in the government,
except Commissar of War, nor one of official responsibility
within the Party apparatus. However, the fact that he was
the head of the army and was additionally clearly identifi-
able as a potential Lenin successor provides the first indi-
cation of the role that the military could play in Soviet
politics. This role has varied little in significance to the
present.
In summary then, the juxtaposition of the principal con-
tenders during the period leading to the so-called Triumvirate
can be stated in the following manner. In 19 23-19 24, Kamenev
chaired the meetings of the Politburo and the Council of Com-
missars. He was apparently not ambitious and was character-
ized by compliancy to the will of his oldest and closest
ally, Zinoviev, who was the stronger of the two. Zinoviev,
as head of the Comintern, saw himself as the main party theo-
rist and "interpreter of Leninism" and therefore viewed his
gravest threat as represented by Trotsky. Stalin's strength,
what "little" it was at the time, was needed to help counter
21Trotsky. Thomsky and Rykov did not figure as contenders
for Lenin's mantle, although Rykov held the seemingly impor-
tant post of Deputy President of the Council of Commissars,
or Lenin's officially designated second. AT least one source
22
of the day characterized him, in fact, as Lenin's successor.
Unfortunately for both Rykov and the American journalist who
saw him as the new Russian leader, the reins of Soviet power
26

are not associated with the government bureaucracy of the
country, but with the communist party. Interestingly, this
lesson was to be relearned during the succession struggle of
the 1950's.
Finally there was Trotsky, hero of the revolution and
grand tactician and organizer of the Red Army; widely accepted
in Russia as second only to Lenin in his intellect and his
theoretical abilities . Trotsky who for all of this was sim-
ply not a politician. Particularly with respect to the
definition that that term was to take in the Soviet context.
THE TACTICS
Although there are a number of variables associated with
Stalin's rise to power in the 1920' s, there are several which
are significant in terms of this study as they have tended
to reappear over time and therefore can perhaps be associated
with what could be termed "traditional" Soviet succession
politics. The first variable deals with the problem of politi-
cal power within the Soviet system and how best to achieve it
within the parameters of the communist party.
In 1922 Stalin was in the best position in terms of po-
tential power by virtue of his unique experience within the
system and his current duties as the General Secretary. This
potential was not lost on him as he methodically began the
appointment of regional and provincial party secretaries from
the central party organization. His vocalized rationale for
this "unfortunate" circumstance was both a lesson in Soviet
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political realities and Stalinist logic. "It was time, he
told the congress (12th Party Congress, April 1923), that
provincial organizations elected their secretaries, instead
of getting them appointed from above. Unfortunately, the
lack of qualified men was so acute that local branches were
all the time pestering the General Secretariat to send them
people from the centre. It is difficult to train party lea-
23ders. This requires five, ten, or even more years." Al-
though Stalin was in the position of General Secretary prior
to the death of the leader of the country, a situation which
was to be totally unique to the Lenin succession, the lesson
of a broad, loyal provincial constituency should not be dis-
regarded. It is an absolutely essential element in the power
equation of the Soviet Union.
This provincial power base was further strengthened by
expanding the party membership. Stalin had to create a "pop-
ular" movement against Trotsky and the Oppositionists who
were for the most part, intellectuals. To do this the party
membership was filled (expanded) with "Politically inexperi-
enced workers from the bench," who would support the Stal-
24inists. This support was operationalized at the 14th Party
Congress in 19 27 in the following manner. (The) tactic was
the organized prevention of debate. The majority of the dele-
gates, controlled by Stalin, behaved like an organized gang
of hecklers, interrupting and shouting down speakers who
25
attempted to criticize the policies of Stalin's Party machine.
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It should be noted here, however, that the Party was "cleansed"
of these types in 1929.
Through Stalin, control by the center of the periphery
became more than a tactic, it became a political law of sur-
vival. Potential leaders in the future, however, would not
have the benefit of years as General Secretary in order to
establish their base but would have to have done a good deal
of this beforehand.
Another variable which came into play during the Stalin
succession was that of factionalism. It is significant to
note here regarding this political phenomenon that Lenin, at
the Tenth Party Congress, had formally outlawed the practice
26
as well as the concept. Factions could lead to the estab-
lishment of other political parties which were ideologically
impossible for the communists. The Stalinist logic on this
subject ran something like this; "minority rights to disa-
gree with the majority and to persuade it to accept the views
of the minority are unnecessary, since the majority is always
27
right and the minority wrong." Therefore, if a "majority"
could be established there would be an end to all opposition.
The period of Stalin's rise from 1923 to 1929, however, was
laced with factional battles. What is interesting and impor-
tant is that for the first time a "left" and "right" deviation
within the Party were defined. That Stalin brilliantly manipu-
lated the two extremes to his eventual benefit is significant
only from the standpoint of studying him in the strategic sense
In any struggle for power, there are issues that represent
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the contending factions. What makes communist power struggles
unique and extremely difficult to analyze is the fact that
they are, for the most part, carried on covertly so as to
preserve the image of party unity. However, the degree of
polarity and the viciousness of the struggle can be gauged
by the amount of published material surrounding the differ-
ences. In the period following Lenin's death, there were a
number of such indicators. For example, at the Twelfth Party
Congress in April 1923, Stalin publically announced the exis-
28tence of the Triumvirate. These three were united for one
purpose, to insure that Trotsky did not win the battle for
Lenin's mantle. But here again, it is important not only to
define the antagonists but to also define and understand the
tactics
.
By definition, the formation of political faction within
a single party suggests that there are differences of opinion
significant enough to risk splitting, and thereby, weakening
the party. That there did exist these differences in 1923
in spite of Lenin's attempts to have it otherwise is signi-
ficant not so much from the ideological issues that were at
stake, but from the need to accumulate and be associated with
power. Over the years, the issues would change but the force
behind the division within the party would always center
around the struggle for power. Additionally, the tactics
employed by Stalin within the parameters of the factional




First, in 1924, Stalin immediately associated himself as
29the spokesman of "collective leadership." It was obvious
to him, as well as to the rest of his colleagues within the
Politburo that Lenin, although a giant during his life, was
now significantly larger than life in death. It would take
time to establish that kind of credibility. In the mean-
time, the factional battles would serve the practical purpose
of allowing the most prominent and charismatic members of
the party to cancel each other out. The trick was to be
left standing when all the rest had fallen. To do this,
Stalin had to be extremely careful. "To foster the im-
pression that he was the true apostle of Lenin,... he was
obliged to straddle the fence. Fortunately for him, there
was at first very little suspicion that he was capable of
30
establishing a personal dictatorship." The two most
important personal assets that Stalin possessed at this
point were his middle-of-the-road appearance and his apparent
intellectual mediocrity. This, of course, from the stand-
point of historical hindsight. He simply was not a considered
threat, although Lenin had very accurately and astutely pre-
31dieted otherwise. Unfortunately for the others, they did
not or would not appreciate the political abilities and ambi-
tions of the man.
So the factional battles began, Trotsky on one side and
the triumvirs on the other. For Stalin the tactics were
basic and commonsensical , "...at this stage, and even later,
he was at pains to appear as the most moderate, sensible, and
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conciliatory of the triumvirs. His criticisms of Trotsky were
less offensive . . .he left his partners to go through the crud-
est form of mud-slinging, from which their own as well as
32Trotsky's prestige were bound to suffer." Additionally,
and of the greatest significance for future Soviet politicians,
Stalin recogni aed the need not only to be associated with the
winning side of any debate, but also to engage in consensus
politics. "He carefully followed the course of the debate
to see which way the wind was blowing and invariably voted
with the majority, unless he had assured his majority before-
33hand." Finally and in the same vein, he followed another
good, solid political tactic. "He instinctively abhorred
the extreme viewpoints which then competed for the party's
recognition. To the mass of hesitating members of the party,
34his words sounded like common sense itself."
The essence of the tactic was that Stalin was building
his credibility, while the others were busily destroying
theirs. Stalin was completely aware of the two essential
ingredients necessary to assume Lenin's role, one was credi-
bility and the other was legitimacy.
THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY
"In January 1925 he (Stalin) at last* brought Trotsky to
resign from the Commissariat of War. After (he) had thus
effaced himself, the only bond that kept the triumvirs to-
35gether snapped." Trotsky was broken, if not beaten and
his position of "greatest threat" was enormously diminished.

Zinoviev and Kamenev had been the most vocal of the trium-
virs and had suffered as a result of Trotsky's eloquence.
Stalin was the steady and credible winner of the first round.
But although his power was still further enhanced, he did not
possess the all-encompassing charisma that would enable him
to claim supremacy in the eyes of the party. To do this, it
was necessary to associate himself as closely as possible as
the direct disciple of the great Lenin. In this respect,
"...the politics of the Lenin succession revolved to a signi-
ficant extent around the question of revolutionary biography.
Efforts were made to show that one had been 'with Lenin 1 and
one's opponents 'against Lenin' at key points in the party
36history." The tactic is important for several reasons in
terms of Soviet succession.
First, as opposed to a western democracy in which the
legitimacy of the leader is defined by the electorate, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of an aspiring Soviet leader is
directly related to the status of his predecessor. In the
Lenin succession, ideology and revolutionary fervor were of
paramount importance and it was therefore necessary to estab-
lish the closest relationship possible with the originator
of the "word" . In this respect Trotsky had joined the party
too late and for all his charisma and intellectual prowess
he could not claim to have been there in the beginning.
Zinoviev and Kamenev had opposed Lenin shortly before the
revolution and could thereby be discredited. Only Stalin and
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Bukharin had long, unbroken ties. Additionally, while Trotsky
in his work, "On Lenin", clearly established Lenin as a great
man, Stalin pursued a course in his literature that elevated
Lenin much more to the position of a god, thereby elevating
37his own significance through association. Interestingly,
the converse of this tactic was to prove successful in the
struggle for supremacy following Stalin's departure.
The variable of legitimacy, absolutely essential in the
successful struggle for leadership succession, was therefore
a product of association with the former leader whose status
had not only remained high, but had in fact, increased after
his departure.
The final variable which was associated with the problem
of legitimacy was that of ideological interpretive excellence
and the need to associate a unique and personally attribu-
table inspiration to the dynamics of contemporary Soviet
3 8politics. As Stephen Cohen suggests, "In 19 25... there
were five •Himalayas', or what may be called 'authoritative'
Leninist heirs. Each qualified by having some combination
of four legitimizing credentials: (1) membership in Lenin's
inner circle before and after 1917; (2) a revolutionary heroic
biography, 1917 being the crucial touchstone; (3) stature
as a revolutionary internationalist; (4) recognition as an
'outstanding Marxists,' which meant as a theorist. No oli-
39garch's credentials were in perfect order." Stalin was
particularly weak in the last category and was, therefore,
in need of strength through association. To accomplish this
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he allied himself with Bukharin who, as Cohen further states,
was considered to be, "...Bolshevism's greatest living Marx-
ist, or, as he was officially heralded in 1926, the man 'now
acknowledged as the most outstanding theorist of the Communist
39International." The duumvirate of Stalin and Bukharin was,
therefore, a powerful one with Stalin providing the brawn
and Bukharin the brains. For Stalin, the key now was to
again use the combined strength to destroy the credibility
of the opposition (in this case the remaining three members
of the Politburo) while at the same time becoming, at least
in the minds of the rank-in- file party members, a true Marxist-
Leninist theorist. This association was to prove beneficial
for Stalin as he was to eventually base his entire legiti-
macy on an inspirational policy first outlined by Bukharin,
i.e., "Socialism in One Country." Unfortunately for Bukharin,
he was a far better economic theorist than a politician.
Stalin, on the other hand, was quick to sense the common-
sensical appeal of Bukharin' s ideas while at the same time
possessing the political wherewithall to orchestrate his own
political fortunes and those of the country. Again, once
those members of the Politburo whom Stalin considered a
threat to his immediate future were discredited, or as in
the case of Trotsky, were completely eliminated, there no
longer existed a need for the alliance with Bukharin.
The Stalinist timing, not to mention the theft of the
concept, was perfect. By 1926, the Party was in need of a
concrete identifiable goal. The revolution was ten years

old and the prospects for internationalism had greatly
diminished. Stalin, if nothing else, was a pragmatist and
he saw an opportunity to finish off the opposition while at
the same time associate himself with a winnable and popular
cause. Economic success would confer ideological legitimacy,
the missing ingredient. Given that he had established struc-
tual control of the apparatus by virtue of his position as
General Secretary, and given that he was able therefore to
control to a large extent the Party Congresses, his ideologi-
cal platform had the support of the majority. In this case
credibility contributed heavily to legitimacy. Additionally,
he applied two other ingredients that were extremely helpful;
Lenin and Leninism, and traditional Russian chauvinism.
In the first case, he manipulated Leninism to suit his
own pragmatic needs in much the same way that Lenin had
manipulated Marxism. In the final analysis, Stalin simply
proceeded with a new and popular dogma that was rather
weakly supported by misplaced Leninist quotes . The fact that
it was so successful is directly related to the second ingre-
dient mentioned, Russian chauvinism.
Stalin intuitively suspected, as perhaps Lenin had at
Brest-Litovsk, that in order for communist power to survive
in Russia, internal strength had to be built. To do this,
all revolutionary fervor and energy had to be directed in-
ward. Traditionally, Russian nationalism had retained a
sort of byzantine mysticism among the masses which the inter-
national appeal of communism had somewhat distorted. The
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key, therefore, was to lend communist ideological backing
to the strong latent nationalism that was already a factor.
At the Fifteenth Party Conference, Stalin supported his
Russian socialism concept by revising some of Engels theoreti-
cal writings and by resorting to a useful degree of hyperbole
by suggesting that if Engels were present he would emphati-
cally exclaim, "To hell with all the old formulas, long live
39the victorious revolution in the USSR!" The appeal of this
tactic is obvious. Stalin portrayed Russia as the only truely
progressive country in a hostile world. By creating an ex-
terior threat while lending ideological legitimacy to the
concept of internal strength, Stalin was able to unit a large
cross-section of the country while elevating himself as the
genius behind it all. By 19 29, all of the opposition had
been crushed and Stalin was hailed as "The Lenin of Today."
CONCLUSION
Factionalism, legitimacy, ideology, credibility were the
independent variables around v/hich the Lenin succession re-
volved. Although the significance attributed to each one
would vary in successive eases., the basic variables would
remain in power. The lessons to be learned from the politi-
cal battles of the 1920' s are directly associated with the
unique nature of Russian political culture and Russian com-
munism as it was engineered by Lenin. Clearly the stakes
were high for, winning or losing was an all encompassing end.
Soviet politics had been defined in classic zero-sum terms,
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a situation which was to take on even greater significance
in the years to come
.
Stalin had defined the power levers to control within
the Soviet system and had developed the tactics, in a general
sense, with which to pursue political goals. The General
Secretaryship of the party was now obviously more significant
than the role originally assigned it by Lenin. Ideology, al-
though perhaps never "pure" was something to be cleverly
manipulated to fit the practical needs of the leadership.
"Collective leadership" had been established as the legiti-
mate transitional stage in the eyes of the general party
membership and the political realities of factionalism and
concensus building within that structure had been defined.
Unlike Lenin who built the political foundation of the
new Soviet state but had not remained long enough to finish
the complete structure, Stalin was to endure. Unfortunately,
although the completed structure was to take on immense




II. THE STALIN SUCCESSION
On April 12, 1945 at 4:35 P.M. (EST), President Franklin
Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage. Less than two
hours later, Vice-President Harry S. Truman took the oath
of office and became the 32nd president of the United States.
President Truman requested that the present presidential
cabinet remain and in the words of the New York Times the
following day, "It was not long before the wheels of govern-
2
ment began once more to turn." From that day forth, at least
for the next three years, there was no doubt that Harry S.
Truman would be the president, barring, of course, another
death. Mechanically, it was all very simple as it was ex-
plained in the Constitution and, in fact, had been done be-
fore and would be done again. For the Soviet Union it is
not nearly so simple. Seven years later at 9:50 on the even-
ing of March 5, 1953, Joseph Stalin was to die a similar death
and, therefore, raise, again, the question of succession in
the Soviet Union. However, at that point the similarity ends.
In the United States, news of Roosevelt's death was
flashed across the country at 5:48 of the same day of his
death, or a little over one hour from Roosevelt's death. In
the Soviet Union, "Joseph Stalin had been dead for six hours
and ten minutes before the Kremlin flag was lowered and the
3
radio announced that the Dictator was no more." Addition-
ally, the Party chiefs and the highest ranking members of the
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Soviet Union met in a continuous session from the time of
Stalin's death and announced shortly before midnight on 6
March that "...the most important task of the Party and the
Government is to insure uninterrupted and correct leader-
ship of the entire life of the country, which demands the
greatest unity of leadership and the prevention of any kind
of disorder and panic . In view of the above , it was necessary
to make at once a sweeping series of changes in the personnel
and organizational structure of the leading Party and govern-
4
ment bodies." The stage was set for only the second leader-
ship succession in Soviet history, but the pattern estab-
lished more than twenty-five years earlier would still prove
valid. Of course there were easily identifiable differences
not the least of which was the fact that for the greater part
of those twenty-five years Stalin had occupied a position,
the like of which had only been acquired by Lenin after his
death, and whose power had only been approximated by one
other human being in the history of man, Adolf Hitler. The
Soviet Union was the very definition of a totalitarian state
and Joseph Stalin had become a dictator in every sense of the
word. "With his death, his lieutenants were faced with the
problem that in a dictatorship there is no legitimacy and
no legal succession."
THE PRINCIPLES
"No sooner had Stalin failed ill than Beria started going
around spewing hatred against him and mocking him. But... as
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soon as Stalin showed signs of consciousness on his face and
made us thing he might recover, Beria threw himself on his
knees, seized Stalin's hand, and started kissing it. When
Stalin lost consciousness again and closed his eyes, Beria
stood up and spat. This was the real Beria--treacherous . . . .
"
Thus, it appears from Khrushchev at least, that the battle
lines for the coming struggle were being drawn even before
Stalin had permanently passed from the scene. Beria was
obviously the chief threat, just as Trotsky had been so in
1924, and in some ways the bases from which each was endowed
with power were similar. Beria, as past head of secret
police and that organization still being heavily populated
by his supporters, had an enormous force equipped with the
physical means of coercion to add a high degree of credibility
to his bid for power. Trotsky had been the organizer and
champion of the Red Army. But while Trotsky had apparently
not wished to pull the physical coercion lever, Beria was
quite prepared to use the power at his disposal in whatever
way that benefitted him the most.
But while Beria was indeed powerful, he was well aware
of the political liability that was also associated with
his past position. He knew that he was not an acceptable
candidate in the eyes of the party and state hierarchy and
for this reason he sought support in those areas constituting




On 7 March, after an extraordinary meeting of the Central
Committee of the CPSU , the Council of Ministers of the USSR
and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the initial
power structure of the post-Stalin period was established.
By virtue of this decision, Georgy Malenkov was appointed as
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and listed as First
Secretary (General Secretary) of the Presidium (Politburo)
of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Had it not been for
the elevated status of the MVD, Malenkov would have held an
enormous preponderance of the major power levers in his hands
.
As it was, however, the Duumvirate of Beria and Malenkov
represented almost insurmountable power while at the same
time posing the gravest threat.
It is also significant to consider that, "After World
War II, Stalin had exercised his dictatorial power through
government channels rather than the Party apparatus, pri-
marily as Chairman of the Council of Ministers (i.e., Premier)
7
of the Soviet Union." Therefore, on paper at least, Malenkov
was the direct successor. But he as well as his colleagues
in the Party Presidium knew this power to be hollow. The
substance was provided through association with Beria.
The two quite clearly held a very threatening and over-
whelming proportion of power, so much so that when a plenum
of the Party Central Committee met on the fourteenth of March,
an important alteration was made in the power structure. "To
grant the request of Chairman of the USSR Council of Minis-




of the Central Committee of the CPSU." In so stating, this
left one man in the position of senior secretary of the
Central Committee, Nikita Khrushchev.
"Khrushchev is outgoing, noisy, a drinker to excess,
daring and aggressive. He exudes confidence, optimism, and
q
energy." This was the man who inherited the position that
had traditionally, if one case can establish a tradition,
been the seat of power. Additionally, and for what makes
for an interesting comparison of Stalin in 1923, "Almost all
of Khrushchev's colleagues considered him to be hardworking
but uninspired, therefore, hardly a political figure of
national stature." Coincidentally it seems, Khrushchev
was not considered a threat. In terms of a succession struggle
in the Soviet Union, this attribute, if one can call it such,
is extremely important particularly at the outset of the
battle
.
Additionally, Khrushchev was reputed to be an expert. in
an area which had been a constant source of embarrassment
and strain on the economy. As the Medvedev brothers suggest,
"one reason that Khrushchev got the post of First Secretary
was that he had the reputation of being an expert on agricul-
tural matters, and agriculture was the sector of the economy
that was worst off..." By pursuing this advantage,
Khrushchev was to gain the reputation of "The Man Who Under-
stands Agriculture" and was, therefore, to greatly enhance
. . 12
a very important aspect of any succession, credibility.
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But Khrushchev was much more than simply an expert on
agriculture, he was truly a modern politican who literally
stumped his way to the top in much the same was as his West-
ern counterparts. Like Stalin however, Khrushchev understood
the need to build a loyal party constituency which could be
brought to bear in the event that the power struggle spilled
over to that level. For unlike the 19 20*3, the Party Con-
gresses had long since ceased to be of any political conse-
quence. Power clearly resided at the top. The post-Stalin
era was dynamic however, and Khrushchev was incisive enough,
or so it would seem, to leave all the bridges intact.
Although there were several other important actors within
the system that made up the post-Stalin power elite; Molotov,
Bulganin, Mikoyan, these three were the most prominent and
most politically active. Additionally, these three were to
define the parameters around which the initial struggle would
take place.
THE TACTICS
As has been mentioned earlier, a duumvirate consisting
of Malenkov and Beria was initially formed which immediately
took charge of policy formulation within the system. Pre-
dictably, however, due to the excessive threat which this
relationship represented, an opposition quickly formed. If
we are to believe Khrushchev, he was the engineer and driving
force behind this opposition. His memoirs shed some inter-
esting light on the nature of Soviet succession politics,
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particularly with respect to the formation of political
alliances. He first approached Malenkov in his drive to
stop Beria and suggested that something had to be done or
Beria would destroy them all. Malenkov' s response, accord-
ing to Khrushchev is extremely indicative of the nature of
winning and losing political battles in the Soviet Union.
"You mean you want me to oppose him all by myself. I don't
want to do that." The statement is clearly full of appre-
hension, if not pure fear. But Khrushchev did not mean for
Malenkov to go it alone and he goes on to explain the exact
tactics to be used.
What makes you think you'll be alone if you
oppose him? There's you and me— that's already
two of us . I'm sure Bulganin will agree. I've
exchanged opinions with him more than once. I'm
sure the others will join us if we put forward
our argument from a firm Party position. The
trouble is that you never give anyone a chance
to speak at our Presidium sessions. As soon as
Beria introduces a motion, you always jump im-
mediately to support him, saying, "That's fine,
Comrade Beria, a good motion. I'm for it. Any-
one opposed?" And you put it right to a vote.
Give the rest of us a chance to express ourselves
for once and you'll see what happens. Control
yourself. Don't be so jumpy. You'll see you're
not the only one who thinks the way you do. I'm
convinced that many people are on our side against
Beria. You and I put the agenda together, so
let's include for discussion some matters on
which we can mobilize the other Presidium members
behind us and our resolutions will carry. Let's
try it. 14
The final result of the tactics so employed was the even-
tual defeat and arrest of Beria. Again if we are to believe
Khrushchev he merely sought to expell Beria from the Presid-




Aside from the covert construction of an anti-Beria fac-
tion and the use of this tactic to crush the most threatening
initial opposition, there is a final tactical element that
bears some consideration as it figures into the levers of
power scenario.
As I have mentioned, Beria, although initially not in
control of the Ministry of State Security, was the head of
the newly constituted Ministry of Internal Affairs and as
such held an enormous amount of physical coercive power in
his hands. In order to take the "more extreme measures"
alluded to by Molotov, it was necessary to find a counter-
weight to this formidable power. The militard card as a
political weapon was now played.
The account of the arrest of Beria is fascinating not
only from a purely literary point of view but from the type
of gangster politics that pervaded the Kremlin just 26 years
ago.
"Still another question arose. Once we had formally
resolved to strip Beria of his posts, who would actually
detain him? The Presidium bodyguard was obedient to him.
His Chekists would be sitting in the next room during the
session, and Beria could easily order them to arrest us all
and hold us in isolation. We would have been quite helpless
because there was a sizable armed guard in the Kremlin.
Therefore, we decided to enlist the help of the military."
One immediately suspects Khrushchev of exaggeration here
because once Beria had them arrested how would he have
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reconciled the detention of the entire Party Presidium to
the rest of the country? Stranger things appear to have
happened in Stalinist Russia, so perhaps Khrushchev is sin-
cere after all. More to the point, however, is the need to
have established a good working rapport with the military
hierarchy. The lesson was certainly not lost on Khrushchev
who would use the military card again.
One final point with respect to Beria is that his arrest
and subsequent execution marked a turning point in the poli-
tics of winning and losing. His death was to be the final
use of such permanent tactics in the process of eliminating
the opposition.
With the last vestiges of Stalinism removed, the tactics
of factionalism seem to have taken on a secondary role to
the search for political credibility, particularly regarding
Khrushchev.
Unlike the 1920 's, communist ideology was not the basis
for the explosive inter-party factional battles that it had
been during the Lenin succession. It was no longer as impor-
tant for a prospective leader to be able to be the modern
voice of Lenin in-so-far as "the revolution" was concerned.
What was important was for an aspiring leader to associate
himself with a popular domestic cause and prove that he was
capable of solving the pressing problems of the day. Addi-
tionally, it was important for these programs to avoid
threatening any of the vested interests associated with the
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levers of power such as the military or the party aparatchiki
As mentioned earlier, Khrushchev had immediately associated
himself with the agricultural issue for, "the condition of
Soviet agriculture at this time (1953-54) was extremely bad,
and Khrushchev frankly drew attention to these defects. The
field was open for new policies .. .and the allocation for
17blame." His new policies were specifically designed to
enhance both his popularity and his power, as for example
his program for making the collective forms more politically
aware. The technique was based on the mobilization of some
20,000 to 30,000 experienced Party members that were placed
in control of key positions with the collective forms. Addi-
tionally, they were paid high salaries for the first two or
18three years. In this manner, Khrushchev was able to en-
hance his power base at the province levle . Stalin had
sought the same end through his centralized appointment of
provincial secretaries. The techniques may have differed
but the results were very nearly the same. It is important
to also remember that Khrushchev had recently been the Moscow
Party chief, a traditionally powerful and influential posi-
tion. By strengthening his position at the periphery,
Khrushchev expanded his potentially loyal and political con-
stituency to contain two-thirds of what was important. Only
the Leningrad oblast party machine was excluded.
Unlike Stalin, who methodically structured a political
base before launching dynamic programs, Khrushchev, probably
as a result of the nature of the man, saw his road to success
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as being associated with spectacular and innovative policies.
Throughout his entire tenure as First Secretary of the Party,
he was constantly indulging in extraordinary reorganizations
which were initially, at least, to label him as a decisive
man of action. The Virgin Lands program was the first and
perhaps the most significant both in terms of its success
and failure. For pure dynamism, however, the Secret Speech
of the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 was a criti-
cal gamble that clearly had an initially positive impact
on his bid for power and credibility.
Parallel to Khrushchev's personal attempts to establish
political credibility, was his need to rid the path to the
top of any and all obstacles . It was certainly important
to establish a broad constituency throughout the country,
but equa-ly important it was necessary to deal with the most
direct and dangerous threats from one's colleagues.
After the fall of Beria, the two most obvious contenders
were Khrushchev in his position as First Secretary of the
Party, and Malenkov as Premier. As I mentioned earlier, it
was (and most assuredly is) politically wise to clearly
understand the sources of power and to select programs and
issues to support which do not threaten these power sources.
Malenkov apparently misunderstood the variables associated
with political power in the Soviet Union.
With Khrushchev the champion of agriculture, and evidently
gaining enormous popularity and support from his programs in
this area, Malenkov needed a countervailing strategy.
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Traditionally, the Soviet consumer had suffered as a result
of the emphasis placed on heavy industry. In the post-
Stalin euphoria, Malenkov apparently felt that by appealing
to the Soviet consumer through a program designed to develop
light industry, he could translate the popularity of such a
program into political currency. There are two important
flaws in the logic of such an approach.
First, because under Stalin, Soviet heavy industry had
been developing for almost twenty-five years, it had been
a traditional source of pride and its accomplishments had
been constantly proclaimed at every opportunity. Khrushchev,
for one, was quick to remind the Party of these successes.
"The communist Party has steadily maintained a course of
overall development in heavy industry as essential to the
successful development of all branches of the national
economy, and it has achieved great success on this road. Our
best cadres were occupied with the work of industrializing
the country. (This kind of statement was bound to enhance
his support among this group even more.) We have a mighty
19industrial base..."
Second, not only were the vested interests of the "best
cadres" threatened, but because heavy industry is essentially
the backbone of the defense interests of any industrialized
society, the military was also threatened. As I have men-
tioned earlier, the political role of the military had been
enhanced in the immediate post-Stalin period and to formally
propose a program which could only weaken this group was not
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a constructive approach to take. "By January 1955 it was
evident that his policy was opposed by... a great majority
of the Presidium. At the same time such evidence as there
20is implies that Army thought was against him too."
What is important to remember about this issue is not
that it was simply an argument concerning the important
economic issues of the time but that, "the heavy industry
issue .. .seems to have been more a dispute on a point of doc-
trine, convenient for allegations of deviation, than a major
21
matter of policy. Just as the ideological issues of the
Lenin succession had been more a tactic for dividing and
discrediting the opposition, the economic issues of 1954-55
served the same purposes.
Another tactic that was employed by Khrushchev in his
quest for credibility as the Stalin successor was his new
role in foreign policy. Khrushchev was clearly endowed with
a high degree of political astuteness in that he obviously
sensed that successful foreign policy initiatives would greatly
enhance his domestic stature and lend an enormous degree of
legitimacy to his quest for the position as Stalin's succes-
sor. With Malenkov finished off by virtue of the heavy ver-
sus light industry issue, and Khrushchev's prestige and power
increasing exponentially as a result of his agriculture and
cadres policies, his only remaining obstacle lay in the form
of further reducing the stature of any and all potential
rivals. As Molotov enjoyed the political stature of a long
time association with the very pinnacle of Soviet leadership
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and as he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the opposition
was clearly delineated. To discredit Molotov, Khrushchev
used the Tito reconciliation and Molotov' s historical posi-
22tion on that issue as a weapon against him. By the summer
of 1955 the tactic to discredit the opposition was clearly
beginning to work, but Khrushchev still needed some enormous
victory to solidify his power. The Twentieth Party Congress
was due to meet in February, 1956.
In addition to Khrushchev's agricultural and foreign pol-
icy initiatives and in order to convey the image of legitimacy
necessary for him to assume the leading role in Soviet poli-
tics, he had also been methodoically pursuing an old Stalinist
tactic. "By the (20th) Party Congress (the new Secretariat)
had increased the number owing their positions directly to
Khrushchev to about two-fifths of the senior provincial secre-
23taries." Although as I have mentioned, the congresses did
not occupy the same status as they had in the 19 20 's, it was
important for Khrushchev to have as much support as possible
at this particular congress. The gamble that he evidently
felt he needed to solidify his power would be taken at that
event.
That the Secret Speech was an enormous gamble may at
first appear to be intuitively obvious. However, what seems
to be the most important element surrounding the issue is not
so much the content of the speech, but who gave it. As we
have seen throughout the discussion of succession politics,
one of the most essential and basic tactics used is the
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isolation and discrediting of the opposition. Khrushchev
was gaining power, that was evident. As a result, he was
rapidly coming to exemplify the most significant threat. No
one understood the significance of his position better than
Khrushchev himself and, therefore, he was forced by the laws
of political survival with the need to confront and discredit
his opponents as firmly as possible . As he states in his
memoirs, when he suggested that he give the speech, the other
members of the Presidium argued that he should not because
24they would all be implicated. This was obviously true, but
Khrushchev clearly gambled that by virtue of the fact that
he would deliver the speech, he would appear as the leader
of moderation and honesty, in fact a martyr, while the posi-
tion of the others would be greatly weakened. The tactic
worked and "within the Soviet Union the speech was hailed by
most of the intelligentsia and Khrushchev became enormously
25popular." Coupled with this victory, the Virgin Lands
project was a huge success in the summer of 1956. "The yield
of wheat was unprecedented in the history of Soviet agricul-
26
ture." Clearly, in 1956 Khrushchev had achieved a high
degree of legitimacy through his economic successes and his
association with a popular doctrine, de-Stalinization
.
But Khrushchev had not completed the important task of
eliminating all of the opposition. Although Malenkov had
been removed from the Premiership , and Molotov had been
discredited over the Yugoslav issue, they remained as part
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of the governmental structure. Just as Stalin had to com-
pletely rid himself of Trotsky, Khrushchev could not solidify
his position as long as they remained. Without a detailed
description of the mechanics surrounding the emergence and
subsequent destruction of the anti-Party Group, it should
be sufficient merely to explain the reasons for its formation
and eventual demise.
True to Soviet political form, emergence of a threat in
terms of potential power aggrandizement resulted in the
polarization of the opposition. By the fall of 1956,
Khruschev" s successes had won for him the position of great-
est threat. The result was that. . . "Malenkov, Kaganovich,
Voroshilov and Molotov openly opposed the new course (par-
27ticularly that) of de-Stalinization . " By all rights it is
fairly amazing that Khrushchev was able to survive this fac-
tional power play against him. It is significant that his
understanding of the sources of power within the system was
such that his cultivation of the military through the person
of Zhukov was the source of enough counterforce to assure
victory. By 1957 the military was such an enormous political
force that its backing was instrumental to achievement of the
28
ultimate power position. Again, as one might expect, how-
ever, such power constituted a threat that must be eliminated.
"In time, he (Zhukov) assumed so much power that it began to
29
worry the leadership." Although Khrushchev suggests that




rising power, it is considerably more likely that the con-
cern was largely Khrushchev's. Since the political indoc-
trination of the military during the Beria arrest and the
anti -party intrigue, there was an authentic possibility,
at least in Khrushchev's mind, that Zhukov and others were
quite capable of engineering a military coup. In any event,
Khrushchev was not prepared to prolong the issue and Zhukov
was dismissed as Minister of Defense.
Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Zhukov were gone.
Agricultural problems had taken a definite positive turn,
and Khrushchev's prestige and political support were steadily
increasing. The final step was taken in 1958. "After
Bulganin's exit from the political arena in 1958, Khrushchev,
now Chairman of the Council of Ministers as well as First
Secretary, became in effect a dictator, enjoying total power
not by employing the methods of terror but rather by appoint-
ing to key posts in the Party structure, the Council of
Ministers and the Army, people whose careers he personally
30had advanced at one time or another." One of those people,
of course, was Leonid Brezhnev.
SUMMARY
It is perhaps useful at this point to summarize Stalinist
and Khrushchevian political tactics in an effort to establish
points of similarity between the two cases. There are
clearly certain variables associated with political power
within the Soviet system and there are apparent techniques
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which have been more or less standard in terms of power
aggrandi zement
.
First, the role of the Communist Party seems to be un-
challengable as the source of the most consistent and manag-
able power base. This is apparently true regardless of the
stature achieved by other organizations and individuals.
The Party offers the only source whereby power, and with it
legitimacy, may be translated from the system to the individ-
ual. The Party, in fact, occupies the position of the voter
public in western democracies. Apparently, at least from
the perspective of the Lenin and Stalin succession, manipula-
tion of the party cadres in such a manner as to create a
majority of individuals owing political careers to the central
machine is a necessary step. This step, however, may not be
required as an initial phase, but only as a process that
must be accomplished in order to maintain power. (In this
case power being defined as the ability to successfully pur-
sue personal programs and policies within the system) . Addi-
tionally, the Party power base seems to be further divisible
into thirds; the Moscow and Leningrad machines, and the
cadres of the provinces. Obviously, then, the key position
to achieve this allegiance is that of senior (first) secre-
tary of the CPSU.
Second, the support of the military appears to have re-
sulted in important political currency, although its useful-
ness apparently depends on several other factors. This
political support is derived largely from the fact that the
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military possesses large physical means of coercion and that
it represents the only organization outside of the Party
that is unified and disciplined. As the role of the secret
police has traditionally been strong, the military, as we
have seen in the Beria case, can act as an important counter-
weight.
Finally, for all the public assurances to the contrary,
there are quite clearly political deviations within the party
that erupt into full blown factions. To be sure, factionalism
is perhaps more an indicator of the political climate than
an independent variable with a causal link to political suc-
cession. What is clear, however, is that it constitutes a
political reality of the Soviet system that takes on particu-
lar significance with the loss of the unifying force of the
leader. Factional allignment determines the political makeup
of the system as it must result in the emergence of one group
over another. By definition, declared factions cannot exist
and, therefore, it is imperative to unequivocably discredit
an opposing force both to purge the system of potential threats
and to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the party members.
Additionally, it is within the parameters of the factional
battles that the role of communist ideology has been rele-
gated. Clearly, one's credibility and legitimacy may be
greatly enhanced as a result of incisive manipulation of the
ideology to "prove" the erroneousness of the opposing view.
It is extremely difficult to assign the label of any Soviet
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leader, including Lenin, with that of "dedicated Marxist."




III. WINNING AND LOSING, KHRUSHCHEV STYLE
If, as the Medvedev brothers suggest, Khrushchev was a
dictator in 1958 (or if he was only in the position of primus
inter pares as I have suggested) , then how is it that he was
ousted in 1964? The answer, at least for the year 1964, was
that Brezhnev did not win, Khrushchev lost. For the first
time in the relatively short history of the Soviet Union,
the country's top political figure had left that position
standing up. The factors surrounding that unique occurrence
and the subsequent rise of his appointed successor, have as
much to do with Khrushchev's political infelicities as with
Brezhnev's astuteness.
Before delineating the series of crucial errors that were
apparently responsible in whole or in part for the ouster,
it is important to review two models of political behavior
that have been associated at various times with Soviet poli-
tics. These models have been described by Carl Linden as the
"totalitarian model" and the "conflict model." In short,
"the totalitarian model of Soviet politics assumes that power
is stable and undivided once a new leader has firmly succeeded
to the top position in the Communist Party." The conflict
model on the other hand, presumes the continuance of factional
in-fighting "...behind the facade of Communist Party disci-
2pline." Because we have the benefit of historical insight
regarding the Khrushchev years and because the evidence has
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continued to support the conflict model of Soviet politics
to the present, it is a much more pervasive argument to pic-
ture Khrushchev as constantly scrambling to shore up his de-
fenses against his rivals. This is particularly true in
light of the role of the traditional sources of political
power as outlined earlier, and Khrushchev's treatment of
them.
"In 1959, Khrushchev was undoubtedly at the pinnacle of
his power. He had successfully routed the anti-party group,
. . .defeated an incipient Bonapartist threat by purging
Marshall Zhukov, . .
.
(and) he replaced Bulganin as Chairman
of the USSR Council of Ministers..." While this statement
of Khrushchev's political gains may be indicative of his
power within the official Soviet hierarchy, it is possible
that even before that year he had begun a rather systematic
burning of his political bridges to the sources of power
and influence.
THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Just as Stalin had assumed the platform of his defeated
opponents, so Khrushchev took up the banner of consumerism
that had proven such a liability to Malenkov. In May 1958,
Khrushchev unveiled a new economic program which called for
4
the rapid expansion of the chemicals industry. Admittedly,
he was wiley enough to couch his new policy in terms that
were designed to obscure, as much as possible, the change
in emphasis. Unfortunately, his assertion "that chemicals
60

(were) now the 'decisive' branch of heavy industry" did not
hide the fact that the traditional emphasis on steel was
being supplanted. It may be significant to suggest here
that in a bureaucratic system such as the Soviet one, rising
up the hierarchical ladder depends in large part on an indi-
vidual's career pattern. Clearly since 19 30, the place to
be had been on the heavy industrial side of the economy
where emphasis from above, and relative ease of quota ful-
fillment had been the hallmark. Khrushchev's plan, there-
fore, stuck hardest at those individuals who had displayed
the most ambition and who had the most to lose. Politically,
it appears intuitively obvious that one would not wish to
alienate such an important constituency. Stalin had sur-
vived the alienation of the kulaks by simply exterminating
them and replacing them with something else. Khrushchev
could not employ this method and, therefore, antagonized a
powerful interest group at no one's expense but his own. The
evidence that Linden uncovers supporting the dangerous con-
flicting attitudes that were openly expressed against the
new program are indicative of two factors. One, that
Khrushchev was not an all-powerful dictator as is perhaps
suggested by the Medvedev brothers and, two, that Khrushchev
apparently did not appreciate the limits of his own power
and the bases from which that power was derived. An article
published in the military journal "Red Star" following the
announced new program is illustrative of the antagonisms:
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To whom is it not clear that enormous harm to
our state would occur if, instead of being
stepped up, the tempos of further development
of industry— including heavy industry—and
the material basis of the economic might and
defence capability of the country were
weakened? ...Thanks to the fact that the possi-
bilities of the socialist economy have grown
and above all to heavy industry, and to the
achievements of Soviet science and technology,
our armies... are supplied with the latest
military equipment and arms which are the
material basis of the Soviet Union's armed
forces . ->
However, as if it were not enough to directly threaten
the civilian side of the military-industrial complex,
Khrushchev proceeded in systematically severing important
ties with the military half of the interest group. As early
as January, 1958, he had begun engineering the organized
reduction of the military forces. In May of the same year,
Marshall Malinovsky was to announce at a Victory Day celebra-
tion that the 300,000 man demobilization was completed.
But further along in the speech the message conveyed by
Malinovsky was one of caution against further such actions.
He warned that there were still forces in the capitalist world
which wanted to make profits out of war and who, like Hitler,
7dreamed of world domination.
Khrushchev, while perhaps overconfident of his own power,
was not entirely naive. He recognized the need to tone down
the nature of the international threat in order to make his
new programs and policies more acceptable. Hence, the
September 1959 Camp David Accords. By reducing the level of
the most significant international threat, Khrushchev felt
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sufficiently secure to proceed in his domestic initiatives
which were to seriously undermine his military connection.
"The demobilization measures announced by Khrushchev at the
beginning of January 196 undoubtedly caused serious discon-
tent in the armed forces. Within two years, 1960 and 1961,
1,200,000 men including 250,000 officers, generals and
g
admirals, were to be discharged." This is an absolutely
fascinating policy for a man who had relied so heavily on
that very constituency in his leadership crisis just three
years prior.
As if the military demobilization plan had not succeeded
by itself in seriously jeopardizing Khrushchev's political
balance, the U-2 crisis of May 1960 must surely have con-
vinced the waiverers. As Michel Tatu clearly points out by
citing a May 23, 1960 "Pravda" article, Khrushchev was under
rather open attack. "Unlike certain s imp le -minded persons
,
we were not exactly moved to enthusiasm by the President's
9foggy, evasive statements." It is very difficult to imagine
a similar statement being written following the Potsdam
Conference, for instance. Khrushchev had quite clearly
caused a shift of the power balance away from his favor, at
least so far as this powerful interest group was concerned.
However, as if the original reduction were not threatening
enough to the military leadership, particularly following
the U-2 affair, Khrushchev further aggravated the situation
and ignored all of the danger signals. On May 7, 1960 he
stated, "This U-2 affair should not induce us to revise our
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plans so as to increase our appropriations for armaments and
the armed forces, or to stop the cutback in military strength."
Then two days later he went even further by saying, "When we
have brought our armed forces down to 2,400,000 men some time
will elapse, after which, in all likelihood, we shall go on
reducing their number."
THE APPARATUS
If, as has been suggested, Khrushchev made some grave
errors concerning the military-industrial interest group,
perhaps his most serious mistakes were associated with the
single most powerful group within the system, the Party. In
both the Lenin and Stalin succession, the key seems to have
been the strong support generated by the Party for the event-
ual successor. Khrushchev clearly appealed to this group in
the early stages of his struggle for power just as he had
sought the support of the military and heavy industrialists.
But in 196 2 he announced a program which went a considerable
way in destroying this power base.
As the Medvedev brothers outline, there were two intra-
party structural changes that seemed to severely damage
Khrushchev's credibility within this important constitutency
.
The first concerned the election of new party committee mem-
bers. "Under the new rules, applicable to governing Party
bodies (i.e., raion and oblast committees, and even the Cen-
tral Committee itself) , it became mandatory for one-third of




workers at the next election." This new statute was com-
pletely supportable in theory but political suicide in prac-
tice. Given that the success or failure of all party programs
and policies is highly dependent upon the degree of support
generated from within the rank-and-file party apparatchik
at the organizational level, the new rule seriously under-
mined enthusiasm by creating a high degree of insecurity
among the apparatchik. Hence, those individuals who had,
heretofore, been numbered among Khrushchev's strongest sup-
porters, and without whom he would not have achieved the
degree of power which he enjoyed at the moment, were not in-
clined to further support him. Additionally, the issue was
becoming particularly critical in the near future as one-third
of the CC of the CPSU was to be replaced in 1965.
The second policy, but by no means less significant in
its impact, was the splitting of all oblast-level Party com-
13
mittees into industrial and agricultural sectors
.
The
result was that, whereas in the past the oblast first secre-
tary had been the single most powerful individual governing
all aspects of his oblast, there now were two individuals
who, at least in theory, shared responsibility. The conse-
14quence was the creation of a "duality of interests" between
agriculture and industry, and the alienation of some of the
most powerful individuals within the system and the exacer-
bation of an already inefficient economic system.
The significance of the Party reform is dramatically
illustrated by Yaroslav Bilinsky in his analysis of the
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Party organization of Gorky province before and after the
reform.
Before November 196 2 the Gorky obkom had jur-
isdiction over 12 city committees, 6 urban and 48
rural district committees, and a total of 4,300
primary Party organizations. After the split, the
Gorky industrial obkom supervised 18 city committees,
6 urban district committees and the Party committee
of the Volga shipping line. Altogether it had jur-
isdiction over 2416 primary organizations with more
than 126,000 members. The Gorky agricultural obkom
assumed control over 18 kolkhoz-sovkhoz production
administration Party committees, the Party committees
of the provincial agricultural organizations and enter-
prises, with a total of 1614 primary organizations and
44,000 members. 15
That Khrushchev's motives were sincere is not in question
but his apparent lack of concern for the political ramifi-
cations that such a policy would generate does support the
thesis that he was anxiously seeking a political coup to
silence the dissenters at the expense of a careful analysis
of all aspects of the problem.
There were other policies that further undermined his
support within the Party apparatus such as the reduction of
special bonuses for party officials and of such perquisites
16
as chauffer driven cars for certain Party officials . In
a society where liquid assets are not nearly as important as
personal prestige and position in terms of the quality of
life, this kind of program could do nothing but create ill
feelings toward its perpetrator. This is, of course, not
to suggest that monetary remuneration is of no consequence
to the professional party worker although Khrushchev appar-
ently decided that that was the case. As Bilinsky illus-
trates, Khrushchev had instituted a systematic reduction in
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the roles of the paid Party staffs, substituting for them
unpaid voluntary activists. Again, the efficiency and
political astuteness of these measures is extremely question-
able. Not all communists shared Khrushchev's enthusiasm for
the greater cause.
Finally, Khrushchev further isolated himself from the
Party/state hierarchy by relying on advisors who had no
official Party role. This circumvention of the bureaucratic
hierarchy quite obviously caused ill feelings and while it
may have been an effective tool in defeating his rivals
prior to 1957, it rapidly became a liability.
Just as Khrushchev was pursuing a course that appeared
destined to shatter the very foundations of his power, he
suffered major policy setbacks that would have severely tested
an even firmer structure. The Cuban fiasco was guaranteed to
conflict with the unilateral reduction of forces ordered by
Khrushchev and it quite clearly served to further intensify
the instability of the military connection. In the domestic
sphere the drastic mistakes of 196 2 involving the restrictions
placed on private plots and the abandonment of the practice
of letting land lie fallow in the summer, "transformed the
minor drought of 1963 into a serious national agricultural
a- *. -.18disaster.
"
These setbacks on the foreign and domestic scene coupled
with Khrushchev's apparent unwillingness to preserve his
political balance in those traditional sources of power
placed his future, and the perceived future of the entire
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nation in grave jeopardy in the eyes of his opponents
.
Khrushchev had come to occupy the position of greatest
threat and in Soviet succession politics, the unification
of the varied interests allied against the threat had become
the approved solution.
What is different about the power struggle that was
developing within the Soviet hierarchy in 1962 is analogous
to the runner who takes a commanding lead at the beginning
of a race and is so enamored by his position that he thinks
the cheers of the crowd are for him when they are for his
opponent who is rapidly gaining on him. Whereas, Trotsky
had displayed a decided lack of ambition and political savvy
in his struggle with Stalin, and Malenkov was simply incapa-
ble of launching a successful bid due in part to the nature
of the political liabilities he inherited and in part to in-
competence, Khrushchev had succeeded, at least in his own
mind. The problem, however, was that he seemed unable to
clearly identify the parameters of his power or to accept
the fact that he was not a "vozhd" but merely primus inter
pares
.
As economic and foreign policy initiatives met with failure,
Khrushchev became more active in attempting to hit on a "quick
fix" to solve the various crises. As the issues became larger
and more critical, so too were the solutions. Michel Tatu
suggests, for example, that in the spring of 1964 Khrushchev
intended to involve individual Presidium members as agricul-
tural trouble shooters. "...Since direct assumption of
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responsibility for agriculture by the Party regional apparat-
us did not bring the expected results, and since Khrushchev
had chosen to solve the problems through increased central
planning, the only thing left for him to do was to bring the
19
major central hierarchy into play." The fact that Khrushchev
meant to assign such matters a chicken and hog breeding to
individual members of the Presidium is extraordinary, par-
ticularly if one accepts the proposal that he was only primus
inter pares and that such a program obviously disregarded
the sensibilities of his colleagues.
Again in 1964, Khrushchev launched a campaign that seemed
designed not to repair the damage previously done to the
important connections with the military-industrial lobby
and the apparatus, but to further aggravate the differences.
He asserted that any sacrifices made for the sake of chemistry
and fertilizer production were justified and even that "some
temporary slowdown in the rate of growth of certain branches
20
of industry was necessary." In addition, he proposed that
21
the military budget be cut by 600 million rubles for 1964.
Then in September 1964, Khrushchev
at a joint meeting of the CPSU Presidium and
the Council of Ministers .. .proposed a virtual
revolution in regime planning, calling for a deci-
sive shift in both the structure of the Soviet
economy and the future direction of development.
He unveiled a scheme for putting consumer produc-
tion in 'first place' in regime planning. ^
As Abraham Brumberg suggests this proposal "was most likely
the last straw for those sundry forces whom he had so con-
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sistently antagonized, and who now came together to engineer
23his demise."
Given the enormous degree of political antagonism that
Khrushchev generated between himself and the most powerful
groups and individuals within Soviet society, it is an indi-
cator of his power and the intricacies of the system that
it took two or three years to operationalize his ouster.
Perhaps it is significant that there was not a highly compe-
tent rival within the Presidium that could engineer the forces
necessary to accomplish the task earlier. On the other hand,
the two prior successions had not been accomplished any more
expeditiously and they had taken place in the absence of a
recognized leader.
A survey of the data suggests that those variables developed
during the Lenin and Stalin succession were very much in opera-
tion during the Khrushchev ouster and the subsequent politi-
cal maneuvering. Khrushchev's attempt to initiate a revolution
from above could not succeed as long as the traditional Russian
bureaucratic inertia was operable. The fact that he was not
able to alter this inertia through the use of terror as
Stalin had, was the result of a combination of factors such
as the maturization of Soviet society and his own de-Staliniza-
tion campaign. Khrushchev's successors had learned the lessons
well and were to prove exceptionally sensitive to the key




Although it is perhaps only technically correct to refer
to October 1964 as the Brezhnev succession, the fact that no
one has replaced him as the senior secretary of the CPSU
would tend to support the statement. Clearly, however, this
would be a gross over-simplification of the events and cir-
cumstances surrounding the years immediately following 1964.
Before engaging in an analysis of the variables that sur-
rounded Brezhnev's consolidation of power, it is important
in terms of future reference to briefly analyze the mechanics
of the coup/ouster.
There are two areas of consideration which must be studied
when analyzing Khrushchev's ouster; the circumstances and
events that actually took place and those that did not.
As Tatu, Linden, and a host of others point out, the con-
flict model of Soviet politics was in full operation by 1964
and there were clear indications at least in retrospect, that
Khrushchev's power was suffering. He had demonstrated a
unique ability to antagonize the most powerful elements of
Soviet political society, and there were open indicators of
a decided anti-Khrushchev nature which must have come to the
attention of the First Secretary. But for all his economic
and foreign policy failures and his domestic political in-
felicities, he was incapable of changing his style or of
absorbing the significance of the situation. As Michel Tatu
points out, for instance, "...he traveled more than ever,
and this is the main reason for what happened to him.
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Altogether, not counting weekends, he was away for about 135
days in the first eight months of 196 4, more than half the
24period." As I mentioned earlier, this technique had proven
extremely effective during the earlier stages of the power
struggle, but by 1964, it was obviously a dangerous tech-
nique. Specifically, Khrushchev's absence from Moscow during
the days prior to the October 14 Central Committee plenum
clearly facilitated the mechanizations necessary to engineer
the coup. If one recalls the intrigue surrounding the demise
of Beria, the air around the Kremlin just prior to the plenum
must have been thick indeed.
If Khrushchev had alienated himself from the powerful
interest groups within Soviet society as I have attempted to
show, it may be important to consider what part they played
in his actual demise, and how they were handled by the new
leadership.
THE APPARATUS
T.H. Rigby suggests four bases of "personal relation-
ships" which come into play when discussing and analyzing
Soviet politics. They are: ties based upon prior service
together (this is the strongest relationship according to
Rigby), shared attitudes based on common prior experiences,
congruent policy views, and recognition based simply upon
25
one man having appointed another. The last one of the list
is the weakest relationship according to Rigby. A cursory
analysis of the data surrounding the years 1958 to 1964
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clearly underscores the fact that not only did Khrushchev
rely heavily on this last category, but that he succeeded in
further reducing the political currency associated with the
appointments by limiting the tenure of those appointed.
Khrushchev's rationale for this policy was probably asso-
ciated with the desire to reduce the risk of the formation
of an opposition group, a program that clearly backfired.
However, given the nature of the power of the apparatus, and
its relation to the success or failure of any Soviet leader-
ship, the removal of the Party First Secretary presented
serious considerations. As Tatu points out, "the average
rank-and-file supporter of Khrushchev--an apparatchik pro-
moted through patronage by the former Party chief— is un-
likely to have had serious qualms about denying old ties...
(as Rigby suggests) . However, he did have to be assured that
26
no thorough purge was in the offing." Precisely 30 days
following the ouster, an anxious apparatus was given the
assurances it needed. "A plenary session of the CPSU Central
Committee was held on November 16, 1964. It is resolved for
purposes of strengthening the guiding role of the Party and
its local bodies in communist construction ... to have a single
27territory or province Party organization." Thus, there
were clear indications that a return to the status quo was
going to be identified with the new leadership. Additionally,
as if to further underscore the reaffirmation of the status
quo, a Pravda editorial of December 6, 1964 had the following
reassuring tone. "The task as it now stands is to assess
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calmly and in a businesslike way the positive and negative
aspects of the reorganizations .. .that have taken place in
recent years. In certain circumstances, when obvious mis-
takes have been made, all that is needed to correct the
situation is to return to the old forms that had already
28justified themselves." One can almost hear the collective
sigh of relief that this statement must have envoked among
the apparatchiki . The importance of this move in terms of
power politics was further underlined at the 23rd Party Con-
gress of April, 1966 when Brezhnev associated himself with
the retrenchment by stating in his speech, "We are pleased
to be able to remind the Congress that the November, 1954,
plenary session of the CPSU reunited the province industrial
and rural Party organization into single entities, thereby
restoring the Leninist principle of Party structure and




Obviously, the role of the Party was to be strengthened
and restored to pre-Khrushchev bureaucratic stability, and
Brezhnev wanted to be associated with this policy. Security
of tenure for Party apparatchiki equated to a vote of confi-
dence for the new leadership and promised a high measure of
unity and discipline among the cadres. That this unity is
important can best be understood by defining the potential
of the Party within the Soviet system. Leonard Shapiro goes
far in clarifying the issue in his discussion of the lowest
level of Party organization, the Primary Party Organization.
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"It is here... that the greater prestige enjoyed by the party
comes into play, the realization that the all-important voice
of Moscow is at the end of the telephone at the local party
secretary's elbow. Moreover, it is often the party and the
30party alone, that in practice can 'get things done."
Clearly, in a system characterized by an enormous and extremely
cumbersome bureaucracy, the ability to "get things done" takes
on very significant import. Moreover, this significance is
not merely associated with rallying support among the rank-
and-file for policies and programs, but it is associated with
much more tangible factors. Again, Shapiro very aptly sums
it up by reminding the student of Soviet politics that "the
primaries (Primary party organizations) are charged with the
duty of exercising 'control' (supervision) over the enterprises
in which they are formed. The party organizations are fre-
quently enjoined not to attempt to 'replace' the normal govern-
ment or economic machinery. But as they have to take the blame
for shortcomings , it is only natural that they should, at
31times, virtually take over the running of an enterprise."
Finally, Shapiro codifies the potential of the Party by
stating, "This great authority of the party in relation to
the vast and uncomplicated state and social machinery .. .can
,
however, only be achieved if the party speaks in one voice,
32if it is disciplined and united." For any potential Soviet
leader, merely reminding the members of the Party of the
Leninist principle of democratic centralism was not enough.
For the majority there had to be an identifiable program that
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impacted favorably upon them. A return to the status quo
was an outstanding political move, particularly given the
rather cautious and conservative mind-set of the traditional
Russian bureaucrat. Brezhnev not only reminded the Party
of democratic centralism, but stressed an increased role of
the Party as a whole and the Central Committee in particular.
Both were easily supportable by the apparatus. "Recently
the CPSU Central Committee has taken a number of important
steps in this direction. The development of the principle
of democratic centralism has found expression in the further
strengthening of the principle of collective leadership at
the center ... (and) in the enhancement of the role of plenary
33
sessions of the CPSU Central Committee .
"
THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
As mentioned earlier, Khrushchev had consistently antago-
nized the powerful military-industrial interest group during
the last four or five years of his tenure as First Secretary.
Given the extent to which the military had been involved in
the arrest of Beria and the defect of the anti-party group,
the question of its role in the October ouster is of no minor
interest, particularly when one is searching for constant
Soviet succession variables. That the military played a
relatively minor role in the mechanizations surrounding the
leadership change is perhaps best described by Tatu.
Judging from appearances, the army played a
minor (role) : far smaller than in 1957, at any
rate. At that time, troop movements were noticed
around Moscow, the army mobilized its vehicles to
transport the members of the Central Committee,
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and Marshal Zhukov emerged as the strong man of
the hour. Nothing of this sort happened in 1964.
As noted, two marshals who belonged to the Central
Committee, Bagramian and Yeremenko, were in Riga
at the critical time , on the evening of October 13
.
The former had some influence as commander of the
rearward area and Deputy Defense Minister, but the
latter, while much more a Khrushchev supporter,
wielded scarcely any power in his capacity as
Inspector-General. Moreover, seven marshals were
in Moscow on Monday the 12th for a Polish reception.
They were Malinovsky, A. A. Grechko, S.S. Biryuzov,
I.S. Konev, K.S. Moskalenko, V.I. Chuykov and V.D.
Sokolovsky— in other words, almost the whole of
the high command.^
Tatu goes on to state that, "In any case, there was no
35
sign of any opposition to the plot on their part." How-
ever, this may be an oversimplification of the facts. Given
the very importance of their (the military) activities in
power struggles of the past, neutrality may have been as
damaging as support had been helpful. If this is indeed the
case, one would expect that Brezhnev would have sought the
active support of the military in attempting to consolidate
his power. This was in fact to be the case, but not until
Brezhnev had insured the supremacy of the Party over all as-
pects of Soviet society. In fact, it is likely that as a
result of its neutrality, coupled with the need for clearly
establishing the primacy of the Party, the military was to
play a minor role in the immediate post-Khrushchev period.
Tatu suggests that, "Since its contribution to Khrushchev's
overthrow had been small, it was in no position to thrust
its chief into the Party Presidium as happened to Zhukov
36
after the 1957 crisis." The military not only did not
gain from the ouster, at least not initially, but, "their
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budget was cut by 500 million rubles for the 1965 fiscal
37year." However, in the years to come, particularly fol-
lowing the consolidation of the Party's position, the mili-
tary was to experience a dramatic reversal of its fortunes.
Significantly, Brezhnev has devised a method for dealing with
the military lobby which has proven extremely effective. As
John Dornberg surmises, "He has consistently reaffirmed the
principle of civilian control without liquidating or publicly
embarrassing his generals (methods employed by Stalin and
Khrushchev respectively) .. .Most important of all, however,
he has forced the military to share responsibility for poli-
tical decisions by drawing the members of the military estab-
38lishment into the decision-making process."
In summary, it can be said that the military remained a
powerful voice within the system and that Khrushchev's antagon-
isms were as much a contributor to his eventual downfall as
Brezhnev's partiality toward that sector has contributed to
his stability. There is strong evidence to suggest that
there exists a parallel between the rising fortunes of the
Soviet defense establishment and the political fortunes of
Leonid Brezhnev.
THE "STEEL-EATERS"
Khrushchev's assumption of the Stalinist tactic for
assuming the policy platforms of defeated opponents was a
contributing factor toward his demise . His appropriation of
Malenkov's consumer oriented economy in 1959 was destined to
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shake the economic structure of the Soviet Union in much the
same way that de-Stalinization shook the political founda-
tions. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, the Soviet consumer
hardly occupies a position of political force within the
society relative to that of the military. Isolated, the
heavy industrial lobby would be significant but not insur-
mountable in terms of power. Combined with the military,
the total strength is apparently unassailable. Although the
immediate post-Khrushchev period was characterized by at
least public tolerance on the part of the leadership for a
continuation of support for consumer industry, the statistics
do not support the rhetoric. Michel Tatu probably summarizes
the issue most succinctly by stating, "The 'steel-eaters'
lobby, as noted on several occasions, is a permanent insti-
tution in Soviet political life, and remained so without
39
any interruption after Khrushchev's downfall."
But perhaps most important of all in analyzing the evo-
lution of Soviet politics is that while certain of the key
variables continued to operate, at least one was to suffer
an overall loss of power. "There is also little to be said
about the police lobby, which kept in the background as far
as the key issue was concerned. There were few signs of any
40
upsurge of politically independent KGB activity." While
it cannot be said that the heavy industrial group supplanted
the KGB in terms of power, it is clear that the latter suf-
fered some loss of political significance as a result of the
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general maturization of the system and the former became
even further entrenched.
THE TACTICS
Having antagonized all of his political power bases while
continuing to remain constantly absent from the Kremlin, the
ouster, once the necessity for it became an acknowledged fact
among his rivals, was fairly straightforward. The variable
of factionalism, so important in previous power struggles,
again became the operable element in the equation. Robert
Conquest suggests, "There is no such thing as non-conflict
politics. 'To govern is to choose,' and that the Soviet
system is especially susceptible to conflict because it is
constructed to force ideological solutions upon the recalci-
trant crises it must deal with... and because its leaders
have over the years been selected for their ruthlessness
,
41
ambition, and intrigue." Khrushchev unified the opposition
and therefore increased the level of conflict within that
model exponentially.
It should be noted here, however, that in terms of Soviet
succession politics, the proposed new leader must be a believ-
able candidate. As Conquest further states, "In the first
place, political prestige seems essential. But. . .a great
concentration of such prestige is not adequate in itself;
there must be credibility about a man's assumption to the
42leading position." This concept is both obvious and logi-
cal but it also defines the parameters of an intricate prob-
lem. How, particularly in 1964, could the organizers of the
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coup satisfactorily achieve the two-pronged goal of stability
of leadership while at the same time placing a credible
individual in the top position? The answer was the more or
less traditional diffusion of power to decrease the level of
threat. Brezhnev, who himself represented a degree of threat
in his position as "heir presumptive" was elevated to the
position of greatest potential power while having a series
of constraints levied against that potential. Not the least
of the constraints was his requirement to share his authority
with, if not the entire Presidium as publicized, then at
least his opposite within the governmental hierarchy, Alexie
Kosygin. Unfortunately for Kosygin , the governmental sys-
tem had never been a base from which to launch a bid for
overall supremacy (due mainly to a general lack of legitimacy
associated with that organization) , and had traditionally be-
come operable only after power had been codified by the new
leader.
There were other constraints that came as a direct result
of the nature of Khrushchev's systemic abuses. The tone of
these constraints was perhaps most clearly set by an article
appearing in the official Party journal, Partiynaya zhizn
,
immediately following the ouster. The author called for a
stop to the situation whereby, "every word of the man at the
top is regarded as a discovery, and his actions and attitudes
43
are assumed to be infallible." Given that the power of
the Senior Party secretary had been largely associated with
his ability to command the total subserviance of the
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rank-and-file party members, this attitude could only force
Brezhnev to proceed with more pronounced caution.
Finally, and perhaps most significant of all, was the
policy of "stability of cadres" with which Brezhnev found
himself saddled. Quite clearly had Stalin been so circum-
scribed, he would never have been able to manipulate the
all-important Party congresses in the 1920' s. This can also
be said of Khrushchev where such limitations would have
severely limited his rise in the 1950' s and would very proba-
bly have cost him his position in the crisis of 1957. As
Grey Hodnett points out, the policy severely limited Brezhnev's
ability "to eliminate from the top leadership those who have
opposed him on policy grounds and to replace them with people
44
of his own choosing." Jerry Hough provides an excellent
statistical example of precisely what the policy translated
into in terms of the CPSU Central Committee. He calculates
that, "Less than 50 percent of the living full members of
the 1956 Central Committee were re-elected in 1956. However,
of the 166 full members of the 1961 Central Committee who
were still alive in 1966, 83 percent were named to the 1966
45Central Committee." This is not to suggest, however, that
in subsequent years Brezhnev was unable to dispose of impor-




As I have mentioned, Khrushchev's official power was
bifurcated into a shared relationship between Brezhnev on
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the Party side and Kosygin on the governmental side. Given
the nature of the power enjoyed by the CPSU within the Soviet
system as has been reiterated by analysis of past political
power struggles, the separation appears extremely uneven.
This lopsidedness is even more pronounced when one considers
Kosygin ' s background. "Kosygin was the typical technocrat
or 'manager' , who had practically never held any Party post.
(His) only service in the Party apparatus was apparently for
a few months in 1938 , when he took over an unspecified func-
tion at the Leningrad Oblast Committee before becoming the
46
city's mayor." The match appears so uneven that taken in
isolation it simply is no contest. However, the situation
could hardly have been isolated, particularly given the
presence of one Mikhail Suslov.
The figure of Suslov is captured most poignantly by the
pen of John Dornberg. It is a picture of a very powerful
and extremely cautious man.
As we know now, the man Khrushchev should really
have been watching was Mikhail Suslov: the Kremlin's
eminence grise
, the myopic professor, the ultra-
conservative ideologist who had been a secretary of
the Party without interruption since 1947, senior
even to Khrushchev in that elitist circle of Soviet
power; Suslov, the recurrent king-maker who had
been either privy to or instrumental in every impor-
tant reshuffle in the hierarchy since Stalin's
death. In the ninety days between Brezhnev's anoint-
ment as Khrushchev's crown prince and the coup itself,
it was Suslov who engineered the plot that ended
Khrushchev's political agony and opened the pages
of history to the Brezhnev era. 47
That Suslov was an instrumental figure in the organiza-
tion of the plot is strongly supported by evidence uncovered
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in Tatu's power in the Kremlin . It was Suslov who headed
the welcoming group that met Brezhnev upon his return from
Berlin on Sunday, October 11 and it was Suslov who led the
attack on Khrushchev at the plenary session of the Central
48Committee on Wednesday, 14 October. According to Tatu's
unofficial source, Suslov was the only formal speaker at the
session. His recollection of the situation is as follows:
Suslov had the floor and was saying: 'The man
has lost all humility, he has lost his conscience I
'
I thought he was talking about Ilyichiev, for I had
been told about that time that he was going to be
removed shortly. Then I noticed that Khrushchev was
not in his usual chairman's place but was in a side
seat at a distance from the Presidium. He was
flushed and was clenching his fists. That was how
I understood what was going on. 49
Although Khrushchev was not reaching for a pistol as Beria
is alleged to have done, the arrest of Beria and the ouster
of Khrushchev are fairly analogous in terms of the intrigue,
deception and sensationalism involved.
What is fascinating about Suslov is that while he evi-
dently engineered the ouster, and that his position within
the Presidium must, therefore, have been considerable, he
did not become the successor. In the post-Stalin period,
Khrushchev was the engineer so that politically, at least,
the precedent had been established. Could it be that Suslov
was so extremely cautious that he was not willing to risk
his gains in the zero-sum game of Soviet politics? Or is it
that his position was so powerful that he represented such
an enormous potential threat he was, therefore, denied suprema-
cy by the other members of the Presidium? The answer to these
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questions may never be known and the analyst is consequently
forced to speculate. Under these circumstances, however,
it may be helpful to note that Suslov still remains a power-
ful voice within the system and has apparently suffered none
of the erosions of power that have been associated with other
potentially powerful individuals. The result is that one
suspects Suslov of cautiously eyeing the new regime as it
slowly developed and then just as cautiously lending his sup-
port to Brezhnev when it appeared that there was little chance
of suffering defeat. Concurrent with this initial period,
it is perhaps likely that Suslov remained extremely non-
committal. Additionally, his tactic was to maintain as low
a profile as possible in order to reduce his presence as a
threat to the others.
In the final analysis, Suslov appears to have been either
a brilliant but unambitious apparatchik who was satisfied
with his position and hungered for no more, or the one single
individual who understood Soviet politics more than any of
his contemporaries but was haltered by an overabundance of
caution. What little evidence that does exist concerning
the role Suslov has played in the Brezhnev era clearly sug-
gest that the latter case is more likely closer to the fact.
That Suslov was powerful but wished to remain in the
shadows does not presuppose that there was a total absence
of powerful and threatening individuals within the new




At the outset, Podgorny perhaps represented the most
direct threat to Brezhnev. The nature of the threat is best
evidenced by a look at Podgorny ' s political biography in the
years from the anti-party group to the ouster. In June,
1958 Podgorny was elevated to the post of candidate member
to the Presidium and then two years later was made a full
member at the same plenum that transferred Brezhnev from the
Secretariat to the governmental post of Chairman of the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet. At this point, Brezhnev was
on his way down and Podgorny was on the way up. Then in June,
1963 both men were assigned positions within the Secretariat,
reversing Brezhnev's downward trend and placing them as rival
"heirs" to Khrushchev. The result of these moves was to
increase Podgorny* s power relative to Brezhnev's immediately
following the ouster.
Ironically, and most fortunate for Brezhnev, Podgorny did
not prove to be a brilliant political adversary. As if he
had been living in a political vacuum during the final years
of Khrushchev's reign and had not understood the antagonisms
that had contributed to the ouster, Podgorny firmly stepped
forward under the traditional banner of failure. In May, 1965
he advocated an increase in consumer goods by saying, "There
was a time when the Soviet people consciously accepted material
restrictions for the sake of the priority development of heavy
industry and the strengthening of our defense capability.
That was fully justified. . .But now collective wealth is multi-
plying year by year, while conditions are emerging that make
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it easier to satisfy the worker's ever-growing domestic and
52
cultural needs." What is significant about this policy
stance other than the obvious ones already mentioned, is that
not only did Podgorny place himself opposite Brezhnev but as
Tatu points out, he created an ever greater imbalance by
53
alienating Suslov. The result of the contest was the re-
moval of Podgorny from serious political contention by "ele-
vating" him to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the
54Supreme Soviet.
Although Podgorny was the most significant adversary at
the outset of the Brezhnev era, in reality it was Shelepin
that was the most dangerous potential threat. In 1964, he
was the youngest member of the top elite (he was 46) and had
a foot in more key organizations than any other member of the
hierarchy. He had been the KGB chief for three years and a
member of the Secretariat since 1961. As Tatu points out,
"In a team with such figures as Brezhnev, Suslov, Kosygin,
55Shelepin inevitably stood out as the man of the future."
However, the nature of Shelepin* s threat was not only asso-
ciated with youthful ambition, but more concretely with his
organizational connections. As Leonard Shapiro points out,
his direction of the Committees of Party and State Control
(CPSC) represented no minor amount of potential power.
The Committees of Party and State Control were
given very stringent powers. They could carry out
investigations into the activities of all party
and Soviet organs, all industrial and agricultural
enterprises, and of all members of the organs of
control and supervision within ministries. They
could order defects which they discovered to be
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put right; and could set aside acts and orders of
which they disapproved. They could impose all
manner of disciplinary measures on 'holders of
office*; they could impose a financial surcharge,
they could demote or dismiss; and they could
forward the papers to the procurators with a view
to a criminal prosecution being launched. There
was no provision for appeal by the individual
affected. (The Committees) Chairman was both a
Secretary of the Central Committee and a deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R. 56
It is a statement of Khrushchev's arrogance and self-
assuredness that he created such an enormous potential power
source. As Yaroslav Bilinsky suggests, "An ambitious man
could use the CPSC network to build his 'empire' within
57the Party." Bilinsky went on to refer to a study made by
Grey Hodnett which tentatively noted that after November 1964,
the "CPSC was indeed beginning to remove some high officials
5 8from office." Clearly, such an ambitious man could not be
allowed to continue unabated, particularly as Dornberg sug-
gests, when there were, "persistent rumors on the Moscow
grapevine and the speculative hints in the foreign press about
his promising future and the prospects of his supplanting
59Brezhnev some day." Just as Stalin and Khrushchev had not
represented a serious challenge to their colleagues, Shelepin
was a clear and present danger that united the opposition.
The result was the abolition of the CPSC in December, 1965
and the removal of Shelepin from any association with a like
concern. Additionally, in December 1965, he was removed from
his post as Deputy Prime Minister under the traditional ration-
ale that it was, "necessary that Comrade A.N. Shelepin should
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concentrate upon his work within the Central Committee of
fi n
the CPSU." By the spring of 1966 the shine was off Shelepin
and following the 23rd Party Congress, Brezhnev had made con-
siderable progress toward consolidating his position.
THE XXIIIrd PARTY CONGRESS
As I mentioned earlier, there were no revolutionary changes
that were immediately embarked upon following the Khrushchev
ouster unless, of course, one can claim that a return to the
status quo in Party matters can be so construed. Stability
and caution were the hallmark of the new regime and, as Wolfgang
Leonard points out, this applied to certain programs and poli-
cies that were not particularly appealing to those who had
engineered the coup. "Continuing destalinization and the
6
1
relatively liberal course remained in force..." In fact,
as Tatu points out, the military budget was cut by 500 million
6 2
rubles for the 1965 fiscal year. However, by the spring of
1965, a "hardening" of policy began to take shape. Many sources
relate this turn of events to the American escalation of the
Vietnam War, but it is also likely that Brezhnev, by this time,
had acquired a clear picture of the sources of political power
necessary to strengthen and consolidate his position. By the
23rd Party Congress in April 1966, the policy drift of the new
regime was quite clear. As Leonard points out, "Even though
there was no open rehabilitation of Stalin, the tougher line
and the deceleration of destalinization could not be over-
looked." In general, according to Leonard, there was a
"hardening" of policy, particularly in the cultural sphere.
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In Brezhnev's speech to the Congress, he declared that Soviet




Additionally, Brezhnev called for greater
discipline within the ranks of the party.
Finally, with regard to the military, Brezhnev had this
to say, "Constant concern for strengthening the countries
defenses and the power of our glorious forces is a highly
important task of the Soviet state. The Soviet Army showed.,
that it is a worthy offspring of the working class
,
peasantry
and intelligentsia. .. (stormy applause). It is necessary ... to
show more concern for the soldiers and officers of the Soviet
Army and their families."
Overall, therefore, the drift appeared reactionary and
designed to appeal to the broadest spectrum of rank-and-file
Party members and to the powerful interest groups (i.e., the
military-industrial complex) . This tact was very likely to
be in line with the general consensus within the Politburo.
For future reference concerning the evolution of Soviet
politics, it is, therefore, important to note here that when
Brezhnev sought to consolidate his power, the program that
was designed to accomplish the task was not only a return to
the status quo in a reaction to Khrushchev's revolution from
above, but a return with a vengeance. Those groups that were
alienated by the new Party line, namely the intelligentsia,
economic reformers and the like, quite obviously did not con-
stitute a viable political force within the Soviet elite.
Survival for Brezhnev was closely associated with appeasement
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of those former groups mentioned, a policy with which Brezhnev
was likely to be comfortable in any case.
It is also significant to mention that it was this Con-
gress that reconstituted the title of General Secretary and
renamed the Presidium to Politburo. Both of these changes
were associated with Stalinist times and serve as further
indicators of where the regime was going in 1966.
By the end of the 23rd Party Congress, therefore, it can
be comfortably maintained that the immediate and direct threats
to Brezhnev had greatly diminished and it appeared as though
he was slowly and carefully consolidating his power. Clearly,
barring a major political or economic faux pas , he began to
take on the appearance of a man planning to be in control for
some time to come. To say, however, that he had achieved the
same degree of power as Khrushchev had enjoyed in 1959 or even
to suggest that he was primus inter pares, would have been a
serious exaggeration of reality. That kind of power was not
to be his for several more years
.
CONSOLIDATION AND SURVIVAL
It is perhaps important to note at this point that while
the Brezhnev era has been rather infamous for its "immobilism"
and there has been a major policy line associated with the
stability of party cadres, this does not suggest that Brezhnev
was unable to use political patronage to his immediate advant-
age. Certainly there were no major purges of cadres on the
national level, but given that the system is based on patronage,
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it is only logical and apparently reasonable that Brezhnev
should wish to place his own personnel in certain responsi-
ble positions. To this end, as Jerry Hough points out, some
significant changes were initially made. "Between April and
December 1965, one-half of the Central Committee's department
heads were changed. That Brezhnev had a major hand in these
changes is suggested by the fact that the replacements in such
key units as the Science and Education Department, the General
Department (which distributes communications to the Central
Committee and is also apparently in charge of security matters
)
and the Business Office were former associates of the First
Secretary while he was in Dnepropetrovsk or Moldavia." How-
ever, it appears that once those understandable changes were
made, further changes were kept at an absolute minimum.
Turnover has also been quite low among voting
members of the Central Committee. Sixty-one percent
of the voting members elected to the Central Com-
mittee in 1961 and still alive in 1971 were reelected
to the Central Committee .. .Eighty-one percent of the
living full members of the 1966 Central Committee
retained their membership in 1971. An incredible
89 percent of the living full members of the 1971
Central Committee were reelected in 1976... °'
Having clearly established the CPSU as the single most
powerful constituency within the Soviet system, Brezhnev
has pursued a policy quite favorable to this group. What is
interesting is that he apparently does not suffer from the
same degree of paranoia displayed by his two predecessors.
In analyzing the reasons behind this atmosphere of political
security, one is struck not by how brilliant the regime has
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been in its policies and programs, but simply by its ability
to survive
.
In the initial period following the ouster, the oligarchy,
as I have noted, was reacting to the exuberance of the
Khrushchev era. Stability and calm were the means by which
the center was attempting to reconstruct the shattered link-
ages with those institutions whose support was absolutely
essential. Quite obviously this is not to suggest that it
was the institution that ousted Khrushchev but it is perhaps
not too extreme to speculate that this is what the members
of the Presidium feared should the situation continue unabated.
Having mollified the Party while simultaneously strength-
ening his own position, Brezhnev proceeded to reconstruct
other important linkages.
The military was among the first to benefit from this
rapproachment. Although the first defense budget suffered
the 50 million ruble cut that appears to have been a hangover
from Khrushchev, the general line toward the military became
much more consiliatory as I have suggested. However, signi-
ficant ties were to be forged by Brezhnev following the death
of Marshall Malinovsky in March, 1967. At this point, Brezhenv
was able to appoint his "war-time comrade in arms" Grechko
6 8
to the position. However, the linkages were to continue
to the point that, as John Dornberg speculates, "Of the twenty
high-ranking military officers elected to full membership of
the Central Committee at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, at
69least seven can be considered political allies of Brezhnev."
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Further, T.H. Rigby points out that, "No member of the Polit-
buro in 1971 has served as Defense Minister, nor did the
achievement of senior military rank play a major role in the
political careers of any of them. Brezhnev has the most
significant military connections (and) the political signi-
ficance of his military experience consists not in its con-
tribution to his rise to Politburo status, but in the use he
has subsequently made of it to cultivate support among the
70
military and ex-servicemen." Given that this is true, it
supports the fact that not only had Brezhnev's power increased
measurably by 19 71 but that the power of the military had also
risen. This being the case, there was a de facto increase in
the heavy industrial managerial class further strengthening
that traditional arm of Soviet society. That this strengthening
has remained constant to the present (as will be discussed be-
low) strongly suggests a contribution toward system survivability
Quite clearly then, Brezhnev's policy was one closely
associated with maintaining strong ties with the important
sectors of Soviet society in an effort to survive. As Jerry
Hough summarizes, "Many of the post-1964 decisions satisfied
the interest groups most directly involved, and none of the
decisions has evoked a total defeat or even a major threat to
71
any of the important institutional competitors." It seems
almost as if Brezhnev's strategy was based on the knowledge
that if he remained in office long enough he would achieve a
position of at least primus inter pares. Seven years later,
ath the conclusion of the 25th Party Congress, he had arrived.
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IV. THE CPSU AND THE MILITARY
PRESENT SYSTEMIC VARIABLES
As I have indicated, Soviet society has evolved such that
there are certain major elements which have a direct and signi'
ficant impact on the conduct of domestic political initiatives
To be sure, there are an enormous number of variables which
could be considered, however, it seems to me that certain
key independent variables have evolved over the course of
Soviet political history such that they are, and will be, the
most influential in determining the parameters of the post-
Brezhnev period and the characteristics of the new leadership.
Consequently, an analysis of these key variables is paramount
to developing reasonable scenarios for the future.
THE CPSU
As I have already indicated, the position of the party
vis-a-vis the other institutional actors within the system
has increased to the point that it sits at the top of the
power structure. This is not to suggest, however, that its
political fortunes are directly linked to Brezhnev's position.
It is perhaps more correct to suggest that each has compli-
mented the other. What is important is to define the deriva-
tion of the party's power and then determine what general
characteristics are associated with individuals that pre-
sently comprise the elite elements of that organization.
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As in any society, power in the Soviet Union is associated
with control of the economic might that forms the basis for
all other activity. Within the Soviet system, this control
is the direct responsibility of the provincial first secre-
tary who, as Alexander Yanov suggests, is "the local embodi-
ment of the Party's universal will, who exercises supreme
control over the local economic empire, who really answers
2for the normal functioning of the empire." The exact nature
of this power is vividly depicted by Yanov in the following
description of how the system operates.
The scene is Leningrad, 19 73. My interlocutor
is in his late fifties. He is a tall man with sharp
features, tastefully dressed, with a decidedly
authoritative, even somewhat arrogant manner. The
word 'boss' seems to be written in big letters on
his face. I am in the office of the general direc-
tor of a large machine-building association. It
happens that I have come at a dramatic moment, when
a shortage of a generally scarce raw material
threatens to halt the operations of the gigantic
casting shop. A suspension of operations will mean
idleness for almost 1,500 workers, a situation that
is among the most dangerous in Soviet industry.
What does a high-ranking manager do in such a
situation? He makes phone calls . The general direc-
tor makes his calls strictly in accordance with the
hierarchy. He first calls the first secretary of
the borough Party committee; then a province Party
committee instructor; then the assistant head of
the province committee's department of machine build-
ing; then the head of the department; then the
province committee's secretary for industry.
Why was he calling all these officials? To
'rob' someone (again semi-official jargon), it
turns out: some cardboard factory or pulp and
paper mill— in short, someone from Group B. Using
the 'vertushka,' it is possible to obtain official
permission for an unofficial 'robbery.' What is
involved is the compulsory withdrawal of raw materi-
als in short supply from enterprises that produce
consumer goods. The consumer can wait; nothing
will happen to him if he 'underreceives ' (also jargon)
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his diapers or slippers: the 'robbery' of light
industry that takes place daily and on a nationwide
scale has been legitimized; one might even call it
sacred.
There is only one way out: once again a phone
call is required. This time it is necessary to call
the Master himself (the first secretary of the pro-
vince committee) . He is the only person who has
the authority and power to order an all-union dragnet,
so to speak, for scarce raw materials. He alone can
call the Masters of other provinces and offer them
a deal. This makes it clearly evident who bears the
final responsibility, so to speak, for the fate of
industry in the province, for the life or death of
any of its enterprises— in other words , who is their
qctual owner. It is the first secretary of the pro-
vince committee— the local embodiment of the Party's
universal will—who exercises supreme control over
the local economic empire, who really answers for
the normal functioning of the empire . He answers
for it with his enormous political capital.-^
Clearly, the provincial first secretary constitutes a
very substantial source of power within his region.
Drawing from the above description of individual power,
it can readily be seen that the combined strength of these
officials constitutes an extremely formidable force on the
programs and policies of the regime. This force is still
further strengthened when it is considered that, as T.H.
Rigby revealed in a 197 8 study of the Russian Republic (RSFSR)
,
the RSFSR obkom and kraikom first secretaries, "make up al-
most two- thirds of all republic and regional party officials
4
elected as full members of the present Central Committee."
This fact takes on added significance when considered in
light of the overall enhancement of the importance of the
party organs and particularly that of the Central Committee
that has been associated with the Brezhnev regime. However,
power, as it is allied with the regional first secretaries,
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is not necessarily a new phenomenon. What is new is the
changing profile of both the individuals who become first
secretaries and the characteristics of the system as a result
of the infusion of these new elements into the power
structure
.
There are two key indicators which suggest an evolution-
ary trend within the Soviet elite. Given that the regional
first secretaries form the vanguard of this elite, a general
profile of this group ought reasonably to be representative
of the trends among ambitious apparatihiki as a whole. These
evolutionary indicators are associated with the type of edu-
cation that is preferred and the career patterns as expressed
in the job connections of the group.
In the realm of education Rigby has discovered certain
general requirements . "For many years now an official could
not hope to gain appointment as an obkom first secretary un-
less he had higher education qualifications. Most persons
aspiring to these positions had professional training—espe-
cially as engineers or agriculture specialists." This was
true for quite some time as Rigby clearly states. What has
changed is both the quality of the education received and
the area of specialization. As Dmitri Simes uncovered in a
recent study of the Soviet elite, the Brezhnev generation has
been characterized by a rather second class education, as a
result of both the institution from which it was received
and the period in the individual's career at which the ad-




study suggests, "The main change over this period (1965-1976)
is the shift away from agriculture in favor of industry as
7the best represented career component." Rigby goes on to
indicate that this shift reflects " longterm trends in the
preoccupations of the regional party apparatus .
"
The picture that begins to develop as a result of an
analysis of the regional first secretaries, and the entire
Soviet elite for that matter, is one shifting away from the
revolutionary turned bureaucrat, to one of increasing speciali-
zation and professionalism particularly as it applies to indus-
trial management. However, it is essential to make a
distinction between those older members of the elite, partic-
ularly the Politburo, and those individuals who received their
higher education as an unbroken part of their youth in the
post-war period. The qualitative educational improvement of
these younger individuals coupled with the "longterm trends"
within Soviet society and the party have resulted in a de-
creased ideological purity and an increase in careerism. The
impact of this shift has not been felt among the very highest
echelons of the party, the Politburo in particular, largely
as a result of the "nomenklatura" system. As Albert Salter
notes, "...the underlying principle (of this system) is that
of officially sanctioned political patronage. The require-
ment that a candidate for any important party or non-party
position be acceptable to a higher echelon of the party's
unified personnel system seems guaranteed to encourage a cer-
tain sameness in the characteristics of the recruiters and
99

9the recruited , as well as to promote excessive cronyism."
Given this system and the stability of cadres policy that has
been the hallmark of the Breahnev era, it would appear that
a duality of interests and experiences is building within the
party ranks . That the older generation as symbolized by the
Politburo, continues to select members homogenous to their
group image and career patterns is perhaps best illustrated
by the youngest member of that group, Grigory V. Romanov who
is now 57. Specifically, Romanov received his college degree
while working full time. As Simes points out, "He already had
a fairly responsible and demanding job as chief of a technical
design office when he graduated from the evening division of
the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. To assess the actual
quality of Romanov's education it is important to consider
that; (1) evening divisions of Soviet universities and insti-
tutes are , as a rule , inferior to their regular counterparts
,
and (2) he joined the Leningrad party apparatus within a year
of graduating. This would imply that he had been active in
the party before, consequently did not have much time to
study." Studies by Jerry Hough and Rigby indicate that
Romanov's educational background is not typical of those just
a few years younger.
The educational data therefore suggests that, at least
in the past, the quality has been secondary to the area of
study. Additionally, it seems that jobs held, particularly
those that have been managerial positions in large, heavy-
industrial enterprises, have been the most career-enhancing.
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But because such jobs require a greater degree of speciali-
zation and expertise, the party generalist simply does not
qualify any longer. The result is a situation whereby a
proven industrial manager is pulled from the strictly economic
sphere of the Soviet system, at some fairly advanced stage of
his career, and placed in a responsible party job to gain
experience. If this job is a regional first secretaryship,
and if he does well, then cooptation into the central party
hierarchy in Moscow is a logical next move. The result is
the emergence of a group of younger party officials with a
far smaller overall party experience level and a much more
parochial set of interests. These interests are heavily
skewed in favor of industrial output particularly with respect
to heavy industry. A classic example of such an individual
is Vladamir Dolgikh. As Simes points out, Dolgikh spent most
of his career in mining management but just before he was
promoted to the Central Committee Secretariat he spent four
12years as an obkom secretary.
Clearly, if more individuals with backgrounds similar to
Dolgikh advance rapidly up the power structure, a new career
pattern will have been established which is even farther re-
moved from revolutionary ideology. The implications of such
a change are extremely obscure although one might reasonably
assume that a stronger relationship between the highest party
echelons and the military-industrial sector could be one result
This relationship takes on an ominous tone when considered
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The party represents the key to political and economic
control of the Soviet system but to think of it as operating
in a vacuum, uninfluenced by other elements within the society
would be to overlook considerable linkages with other signifi-
cant constituencies. The military, as Roman Kolkowicz states,
is perhaps the largest and most powerful of these various
other elements. "The military, because of its organization,
weapons, and philosophy represents the single greatest threat:
it controls vast means of physical coercion, it is an inte-
grated mechanism that can, in theory, respond to a few com-
mands and can be rapidly mobilized; and it is a closed group
13
with an elitist, anti-egalitarian value system." By this
definition, the military has many of the characteristics that
the party apparatus seems to posses or be in the process of
evolving. Just as the party is finding it more and more
necessary to coopt or recruit highly trained specialists
into its ranks, so too have the military for many of the same
reasons. "The influx of new and complex technology," as
Kolkowicz goes on to say, "into the military service, and the
complexity of nuclear warfare and the strategies and doctrines
for the conduct of such a war have had a liberating effect on
the officer corps, endowing experts with greater authority and
role... The party's new pragmatism and higher appreciation of
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most professional groups— the managers, scientists/ and the
military among them—has further strengthened the latters
14position." Additionally, as Harriet and William Scott have
intimated, the military has been much quicker to recognize
15
and promote these specialists within the organization.
Seweryn Bialer also supports this phenomenon in his 1978 study.
"The institution where the greatest turnover of personnel, a
really massive replacement, has taken place in the 1970 's at
the upper-middle and middle levels of power in the Soviet
16
armed forces." This trend is particularly significant in
view of the party's apparent recalcitrance in keeping in step
with this important constituency. Additionally, it appears
as though these individuals will be in important positions
within the military hierarchy in the next few years, thus con-
stituting a powerful new force to be dealt with during the
period of succession.
However, given that there are also powerful elements within
the middle and upper levels of the party hierarchy who iden-
tify with the "new class" of Soviet elite, what, if any,
are the linkages with the military? Perhaps the simplest
method for answering that question is to define the functional
interests of the armed forces. According to Kolkowicz they
are: "The maintenance of a high level of investments in
heavy industry; the maintenance of high levels of military
budgets and expenditures and finally, the maintenance of a
certain level of international political tension." Although
it might reasonably be argued that these same interests may
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be associated with the military of any major industrial nation,
the extent to which they have been met in the Soviet Union
suggests a powerful force with strong political influence.
Available evidence surrounding the political ties of the
military supports a situation that implies a closeness not
found in any major first world power, and certainly not in
any western state. Beginning at the top, "overall control of
the Soviet armed forces lies with the Council of Defense,
18
chaired by the party's General Secretary." Additionally,
the interests of the military are directly represented by the
presence of the Defense Minister in the Politburo. But per-
haps most indicative of the marriage is that, "of the Polit-
buro members present on the mausoleum on 7 November (1979)
,
Brezhnev, Ustinov and Andropov hold high military rank, and
while the leaders standing to Brezhnev's left were in civilian
clothes, on his right stood the top commanders of the Armed
Forces. There is no evidence of any conflict in aims between
19Party and military." That this situation exists during an
era in which the party is dominated by old apparatchik's and
ideologues (in the case of Suslov) whose interests have the
most potential for difference with the military, is cause for
some degree of concern when considered in light of the elite
trends mentioned earlier. Clearly, the passing of those aged
appartchiks presently in control of the reins of power could
dictate a situation whereby the confluence of interests be-
tween the party and the military is greater than at any time
in the past. This is further strengthened by Simes' analysis
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that, "Since the military, on many issues allied with the
defense-oriented industries, enjoys a particularly comforta-
ble position in the Soviet institutional structure, it is not
surprising that periods of bureaucratic stalemates usually
favor its interests." Additionally Simes goes on to say
that, "Characteristically, according to some informed specula-
tion, major Soviet weapons programs were launched in years
of political transition, when leaders maneuvering for power
had to be particularly sensitive to the demands of the mili-
20tary- indus trial complex." If this is in fact so, and sta-
tistics seem to support this thesis, particularly where
Brezhnev is concerned, then the outlook for the future is for
more of the same. While economically the continuation of
defense spending at its present rate will cause significant
strains on the resources of the country (the exact nature of
which will be pointed out later) , the technocratization of the
major political actors in the system make any reduction seem
highly unlikely.
Additionally, as Kolkowicz points out, there is a secondary
connection between heavy industrial strength and Soviet mili-
tary strategy. As he points out, Colonel Trifonenko had the
following to say concerning the need for strong investment in
heavy industry; "in a possible nuclear-missile war, economics
will determine its course and outcome first of all and mostly
by what it is able to give for defense purposes before the
21
war begins, in peacetime." Shortly thereafter, another
Soviet military strategist, Colonel Grudinin, stated that,
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"he who does not learn to defeat his enemy in peacetime is
22doomed to defeat in war." While this may seem simplistic,
it is an extremely persuasive argument when applied to the
already receptive ears of the ambitious party member whose
background has been heavily steeped in military-industrial
enterprises and areas.
There is however another aspect of military power that
will most certainly play an influential part in the political
infighting following the passing of Brezhnev and his contem-
poraries. This aspect is perhaps most succinctly stated by
William and Harriet Scott. "Without military power, the Soviet
23Union today would simply be another developing nation." This
statement is true not only for its reference to international
political influence but also from the fact that the enormous
Soviet GNP is directly related to those industrial enter-
prises which constitute the material basis for a strong modern
force. Clearly in this instance, one hand does indeed wash
the other. But just as the economy is dependent on the mili-
tary and vice versa, so too does the party depend on its
ability to manipulate the military. As Kolkowicz suggests,
"The Soviet Union's extensive political -military commitments
as a superpower would be severely compromised by a major open
crisis between the two institutions, so that the party is
forced to be more circumspect in its treatment of the mili-
24tary." That this is so today, reflects the enormous influ-
ence of the military in Soviet domestic politics and under-
scores the necessity of any potential successor not only to
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consider their interests but to be clearly identifiable as one
who understands their significance and specific needs. I, for
one, am in complete agreement with a recent assessment made
by the Scotts
:
Power, once achieved, is seldom relinquished
willingly. The prestige of the Soviet leadership
is based to a great extent on the super-power
status their armed forces have achieved for the
nation. Even the average Soviet citizen appears
to take pride in seeing that leaders of foreign
nations visit his country to ask for arms or to
sign international agreements. Whatever the cost
may be in economic or social terms, the continued
support and buildup of the Soviet armed forces will
be maintained. The momentum of the military drive
has not yet run its course. 25
However, the momentum may, in the long run, have been
affected by the Afghanistan invasion. If the Soviet military
can become immersed in a "no-win" situation, it would seem
that their credibility as a political tool would suffer by
some measure or another. Clearly, the relative ease with
which the Czechoslovakia experiment was concluded, coupled
by a general lack of decisive western response could only
have enhanced the position of the military. The statistics
strongly suggest that it did. Unfortunately for the west,
and unlike the United States, the Soviets appear to clearly
understand the need for an immediate and decisive victory
in Afghanistan. Perhaps Dan Rather's question to an Afghan
guerilla as to why he was fighting as the war was already lost
was more correct than anyone thought at the time. The latest
reports paint a rather bleak picture (the situation in Konar
province, for example) and suggests that the Soviet military-
party linkage will become still firmer.
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There is, however, an interesting twist that has come
about as a result of the new 1977 Soviet Constitution. Tra-
ditionally, and as has been reaffirmed in Article 6 of the
new constitution, "The leading and guiding force of Soviet
society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state
organizations and public organizations is the Communist Party
26
of the Soviet Union." However, as Peter S .H . Tang points
out, there is an interesting situation that has developed
regarding the military. "The Soviet Constitution states that
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall form
the Council of Defense of the USSR and confirm its composi-
tion; appoint and dismiss the high command of the Armed Forces
of the USSR (Art. 121, Sec. 14). " This article does not
presently represent a dichotomy of interests between the
party and state as Brezhnev occupies both top positions within
each organ. A potential for crisis could develop, however, if,
as is most likely, Brezhnev's power is diffused following his
demise. In this instance, the military may see its interests
being served most effectively by supporting the President
of the Supreme Soviet, particularly if his political platform
vis-a-vis the armed forces is more favorable than that of
the party ' s top man
.
Additionally, it must be remembered that although it is
the local party officials that can "get things done," the
industrial managers, while they may be members of the party,
are part of the state bureaucracy. They are a powerful
interest group of themselves and when combined with the
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military would constitute a considerable threat to the party





Each previous Soviet succession, while characterized by
conflict within the system's elite and its powerful interest
groups, has of necessity required a nucleus around which the
differences developed and from which positions were articu-
lated. Traditionally, one of the main areas of confrontation
and eventual success has dealt with economic problems . For
this reason it is absolutely essential to identify those Soviet
economic variables which will most likely become issues in
the months and years following the Brezhnev regime. These
variables become more important when one considers two facts
concerning the present Soviet economic scene. One is that the
Brezhnev regime is generally viewed as sorely lacking in
dynamism, particularly in the economic sphere, and appears
bent on passing major systemic decisions on to a successor
regime. Second, and as an indicator of a situation requiring
decisive action, "In the decade 1951-60 the growth rate (of
the Soviet economy) was 5.8 percent. In the following decade
it declined to 5.1 percent. And in the quinquennium 19 71-75
it fell further to 3 . 7 percent." However, to fully appreci-
ate the significance of these facts, it is necessary to at
least briefly review the evolution of the system.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1979 the Soviet Union had the "second largest economy
2in the world" and was (is) by anyone's measure a great global
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power. However, its present status must consider its histor-
ical evolution. This necessity is perhaps more significant
in the case of the USSR than in any other country in the
world, communist or otherwise.
War Communism, or the economic policy that prevailed from
1918 to 1921, was Lenin's method for ideologically explaining
the beginnings of a command economy. After nationalizing all
large scale factories and diffusing the agricultural land
among the peasantry, the Bolshevics soon discovered that the
system was rapidly breaking down. The peasants were unwilling
to produce and sell surplus agricultural goods (that over and
above their immediate requirements) for the simple reason
that there was no manufactured goods to buy. By establishing
a system in which the central feature... "...and key to the
whole system was the requisitioning of food supplies from
3peasants," the needs of the military and the industrial sec-
tor could be met . Unfortunately, the forced requisitioning
of agricultural goods caused an extremely negative reaction
from the peasantry and, at the completion of the civil war,
the system had to be abandoned.
In its place, Lenin established the New Economic Policy
(NEP) which was essentially a return to semi-capitalism. The
forced requisitioning of agricultural goods was halted and
the peasants were allowed to sell their goods on the open
market. "Favorable prices for agriculture provided additional
incentives for the farmer to produce as much as he could for
the market. In fact, the government retreated even further
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and allowed the richer farmers to lease land and even to hire
4for wages the poorer farmers." This was indeed a major
ideological concession. The problem was not only that the
NEP was an ideological step backwards as argued by Trotsky,
but it was not allowing for rapid enough industrialization.
"The great equalitarian advance in land ownership. . .proved
to be the greatest barrier to rapid industrialization by re-
ducing the marketable agricultural surplus. This land reform
had the further disadvantage of reducing the size of the aver-
age land holding to such an extent that it was unprofitable
5to buy and use efficiently more modern agricultural machinery."
By 1927, Stalin had won the initial succession struggle
and had firmly consolidated his power as the leader of the
country and the Party. His first objective was to insure
strength and military might. As the Soviet industrial base
was small and rather technologically backward, the need for
Western technology was an absolute necessity. To acquire
this technology he would have to gain sufficient amounts of
foreign exchange through exports to pay for it. In 1927, the
only goods in the exportable category from the Soviet Union
were primary products , specifically agricultural goods . With
rapid industrialization as the main goal, and in particular
heavy industry, Stalin's options were limited to ways in which
to acquire the necessary agricultural surplus to pay for western
technology. His decision to "collectivize," which began in
earnest in the fall of 1929, was marked by a civil war in
which large numbers of peasants were killed or exiled to
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Siberia for resisting. . .Livestock were slaughtered by the
farmers, and crop production fell . . .inspite of the lower
total production, he (Stalin) greatly increased the amount
of grain actually marketed and available for government use
as capital. Obviously, there was reduced consumption through-
out the country in order to sustain the high levels of invest-
7
ment (25 or 35 percent) in industrialization. Finally, as
industry became stronger, the profits received from produc-
tion were reinvested into the industry rather than passed on
to the workers in the form of higher wages , again at the ex-
pense of reduced consumption although this time it was the
urban worker who suffered.
It is significant that the Stalinist model for economic
development has become the basis of legitimacy for each suc-
cessive leadership of the Soviet Union. Upon Stalin's death,
however, there was to appear the first in a series of declara-
tions and pronouncements on behalf of the Soviet consumer goods
industry. Georgi Malenkov was appointed as the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers in addition to Premier of the Supreme
Soviet directly following the death of Stalin in March, 1953.
In August he was to launch a "concerted press campaign. . .on
improving the quantity and quality of goods .. .Shortcomings
were illuminated in considerable quantity, but no solution
other than the typical Soviet exhortations were ventured in
gthe press campaign." The obvious intent was to establish
a broad popularity base from which Malenkov could launch him-
self firmly into the seat of unequalled power. Unfortunately
113

for Malenkov, he did not seem to fully appreciate the enor-
mour success of heavy industry and the significance it held
for the ruling elite. This success was apparent even outside
of the Soviet Union. "...it is heavy industry that is the
brightest side of the Soviet economic picture. Soviet heavy
industry has set new production records annually every year
9for the last half decade or more." It should be remembered
here that no bid for power in the Soviet Union has been
successfully concluded without the full support of the mili-
tary. Clearly the military could not support an economic
policy contrary to its needs and interests, and as Harry
Schwartz of the New York Times observed, "...the world situa-
tion worsened from the Soviet point of view during the last
half of 1954, (and) the Malenkov policy came under ever
sharpening attack from the Khrushchev forces , supported appar-
ently by the military." The result was the subsequent ouster
of Malenkov and the ascendancy of Khrushchev who was very
much an advocate of heavy over light industry. He constantly
harped on the theme that by raising industrial output it indi-
cated the success of socialism over capitalism.
With Khrushchev's consolidation of power in 1957, the
pattern of the Soviet domestic economic structure (Khrushchev
to the contrary) was even further strengthened and this basic
structure has remained to the present. The reasons for con-
tinuation are fairly basic. Governmental legitimacy in the
Soviet Union depends on clear control of the party apparatus
and the support of the major interest groups. As heavy
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industrial formation expanded, the bureaucracy involved in
controlling and managing it became increasingly powerful.
The proliferation of the technocrats coupled with the always
enormous military .. .industrial complex succeeded in continually
reinforcing itself. The Cuban Missile Crisis only served to
enhance the need for continued emphasis on industry and tech-
nology related to military strength. The successors to
Khrushchev immediately set out to establish communist legiti-
macy and thereby their own position within the hierarchy. Al-
though following the past trends of paying lipservice to an
increase in the production of consumer goods , the force of
Brezhnev's speech marking the 47th anniversary of the Bolshevic
Revolution in 1964 was clearly gauged to satisfy the powerful
industrial interests while serving the additional purpose of
instilling pride in the population and diverting interest
from the consumer sector. "We have created mighty productive
forces. Industrial and agricultural production continue to
grow and the creation of the material and technical basis of
Communism (a reference to the fact that they are not quite
there yet) is proceeding successfully. The average annual
growth in industrial output in the Soviet years has been 10%.
This year we shall produce 85 million tons of steel... 62
million tons of pig iron, 223 million tons of oil and 551
12
million tons of coal." Finally, Brezhnev sets the stage
for future growth and emphasis by resorting to a common theme
in Soviet internal propaganda, "The policy of the imperial-
ist powers has forced our country to concentrate efforts on
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producing mighty nuclear missile armaments, a reliable guaran-
tee of our security and of the security of our friends and
13
allies."
The Stalinist equation of heavy industrial emphasis to
national (and therefore international) strength has .continued
to the present and has largely contributed both directly and
indirectly to the situation now confronting the Soviet leader-
ship. This emphasis coupled with the fantastically high pro-
duction targets established by the succession of five year
plans beginning in 1928 has resulted in the continued forced
savings on the part of the Soviet worker and the loss of tech-
nological innovation at the expense of continued production.
THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY
The Stalinist model that has been so closely adhered to,
partially by design and partially be default, may have to be
considerably modified in the 1980 's. As Mark Miller points
out, "The impressive growth rates of the Soviet economy have
traditionally been sustained by ever larger inputs of labor
14
and capital," but the Soviet working age population will
15
only increase by .5% in the early and mid-19 80's. As a
result, there will be an obvious need to increase productivity
if the planned growth rates are to be met. However, if sub-
stantial increases in productivity are not achieved, the
leadership, according to Dr. Holland Hunter, "...will have
to find other ways to augment the scheduled increases .. .or
16
settle for very low rates of growth." Dr. Hunter goes on
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to say that there are several ways in which the working popu-
lation may be expanded. One solution might be to reallocate
employment from service to industry; another might be to
raise the retirement age and attempt to recall large numbers
of those already retired. Additionally, secondary school
quotas could be reduced, releasing more potential employees
for usage at the reverse end of the spectrum. Finally, and
perhaps the most unsavory solution for the leadership would
be the reduction or freezing of current military manpower
17levels. It is generally agreed however, that even if all
of these measures are taken collectively the result would
merely be a postponement of an inevitable drop in available
manpower. I, for one, am extremely skeptical that any reduc-
tion or freeze of military strength could conceivably take
place while Secretary Brezhnev and the present leadership is
in power. This point is clearly underscored by the statement
of Secretary Brezhnev at the 24th Party Congress in 1970 in
which he reminded the delegates that it was because the high-
est priority was persistently accorded to heavy industry (de-
fense related industry) that the Soviet Union was able "to
end the centuries old backwardness" and transform itself into
a mighty power. More specifically, Brezhnev went on to say
that, "...without developing heavy industry we cannot main-
tain our defense capability at the level necessary to guaran-
18tee the country's security." Statements of this nature
(added to the fact that when the 10th Five Year Plan was
published in 197 5 it was conceded that the proposed goal of
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an increase in the consumer goods sector outlined in the Ninth
Five Year Plan had not been met, and that a return to a
favoring of heavy industry over the consumer sector was
necessary) , further serve to underscore both the power of
the defense related interest groups and the economic fixation
19
of the Soviet bureaucratic elite. With defense the stated
rationale for the continued development of heavy industry,
it does seem unlikely that the military will undergo any
reductions in strength.
A second solution is to increase the productivity of those
workers that are available, or more specifically to increase
productivity through technological innovation. For a variety
of reasons, this is a problem for the Soviets. In the first
instance there is a general lack of incentive on the part of
factory managerial personnel to suffer the production shut-
down necessary for emplacement of advanced technological tech-
niques . For most industry managers the pressure to meet pro-
duction objectives is so great that they can little afford
the short-term loss in output. Additionally, indigenous
technological innovations have been severely handicapped by
Communist Party doctrines which, "...has remained unwilling
to let Soviet scientists participate freely in the reciprocal
exchange and international communication that appear to be
essential for genuinely creative work at the frontier of
20knowledge .
"
The third, and perhaps most obvious solution in some
respects, is the importation of either vast quantities of
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finished products from the West or the transfer of large
amounts of advanced Western technology; in other words, an
increase in the level of trade with the West. As Mr. Miller
points out, the Soviets are extremely aware of the signifi-
cance of both approaches and notes that Secretary Brezhnev
has referred to foreign trade as a "big reserve" for Soviet
21
economic development. Admittedly, there is a fair amount
of controversy concerning the actual impact of Western tech-
nology on the Soviet economy but at least one study conducted
by Donald Green and Herbert S. Levine of the University of
Pennsylvania indicates that, "the net addition to output re-
sulting from a unit increase in the stock of imported Western
machinery in Soviet industry is 8 to 14 times the corresponding
22
effect of a unit increase in the 'indigenous 1 capital stock."
Although this is a little misleading in that imported tech-
nology makes up a very small fraction of the total Soviet
output, the implications for future Soviet leaders are signi-
ficant. However, there are indications that Soviet desires
for "the latest" technology usually means, in practice, "the
23latest proven technology." Again this reflects the need on
the part of industrial managers to maximize production immediate-
ly to meet the demands of the Plan. As a result of this
philosophy, it has been argued that technology transfers to
the Soviet Union, particularly in those areas that are subject
to rapid changes, have resulted not in a situation whereby the




able to effectively catch up. Again, the implication for
the Soviet leadership of the 19 80's is ominous.
The second part of the problem affecting the need for
increased trade with the West deals with the subject of pay-
ment. Additionally, this aspect is directly related to the
Soviet Union's energy production. Soviet production of oil
and gas has significantly increased since 1966 and, in fact,
oil production alone has grown at a rate of 8.1% per year
25
since 1960. However, the CIA in 1977 predicted that because
the Soviets had concentrated on production at the expense of
exploration, they were rapidly approaching maximum output and
could reach that point as early as 1978 but certainly not
later than the early 1980's, after which, production would
26fall slightly. Oil consumption has been increasing, although
to date not as fast as production, therefore, allowing the
Soviets to earn hard currency as a result of oil exports.
The predicted fall in production will reverse this position,
making it much more difficult to earn the much needed foreign
exchange to pay for Western technology. A further constraint
facing the Soviet leadership in this area, deals with the
subject of energy conservation. Unlike the West, the majority
of energy consumption is for industrial purposes and very lit-
tle is a result of private use. Therefore, the energy conser-
vation measures that are "easiest" to develop in the West to
derive fairly dramatic gains, have a substantially reduced
effect in the Soviet Union. Faced with these kinds of problems
it is interesting to note what "solutions" have begun to
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manifest themselves and it is also indicative of how the
Soviet elite views not only its global status but additionally
its domestic "class" security. As I mentioned earlier, the
10th Five Year Plan published in 1975 accepted a reduction
in the consumer goods sector at the expense of a continued
emphasis on heavy industry. Several weeks after the official
announcement and after the government had admitted that it had
not been able to meet the proposed production goals of consumer
goods as outlined in the 9th Five Year Plan, a subdepartment
head of Gosplan, the state economic planning agency, published
an article attacking consumerism. In it he suggested that
what was needed was a "strengthening of the socialist way of
life" and a "consolidation of communist ideals" not an increase
in consumer goods. Moreover, he maintained that the concept
of "quality of life" was a capitalist invention designed to
27
cover up difficulties and conflicts within Western economies.
Obviously, it appears that if cuts are going to be made to
strengthen the Soviet hard currency position, it will come
first in the sphere of the average citizen at the marketplace.
If, as I have attempted to point out, there is a definite
real need for Western high technology particularly in the
critical area of oil production, the Soviets must deal with
the impending shortage in their present means of acquiring
foreign exchange. Particularly if it is kept in mind that
the Soviets have incurred a sizable debt and, "most hard cur-
rency earnings after 19 80 will...have to be earmarked for




of Western technology and grain." In 197 7, for instance,
it was estimated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development that the debt owed to international banks and
Western governments from the USSR and its Eastern bloc allies
was about $4 7 billion. The report went on to say that the
majority of this debt was a direct result of an increase in
the importation of sophisticated manufactured goods from the
West; a difference of $24 billion from 1976. The deficit,
averaging about $6 billion per year, was financed by loans
29that will come due, as Miller points out, in the early 1980' s.
Assuming that the Soviet leadership elects to continue the
"business-as-usual" approach that it has adopted thus far, and
bearing in mind that it is generally conceded in the West and
at least partially alluded to within the USSR that there is a
very real need for Western technology, the question of options
available becomes decidedly important.
Unlike 1928, the Soviet agricultural picture is bleak, and
the USSR is in no position to realistically consider agricul-
tural products as a source of foreign exchange. This is par-
ticularly true if one accepts the view held by the CIA that
the unusually temperate winters of the past several years will
return to more normal conditions adding to the already serious
30problems experienced by Soviet farming. In fact, the situa-
tion takes on an even more critical dimension if the Soviets
fall dramatically below the Plan goal and are forced to pur-
chase grain from the U.S. and other Western producers in a
period of reduced availability of hard currency. However,
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there are most definitely alternative products, most primary,
which include such items as wood, and related products,
natural gas and a few others . The problem with many of these
products, unfortunately, is that the situation may very well
develop such that the USSR will be forced to divert trade
from its Eastern bloc satellites to the West. This will un-
doubtedly cause hard feelings among those countries and only
serve to exacerbate the growing problem of "Eurocommunism."
There is finally one area in which the Soviets may be able
to earn large amounts of foreign exchange and at the same time
enable them to continue the present emphasis on heavy indus-
try; this area being arms sales. In my opinion, this pros-
pect will have the most positive impact on the leadership and
will fit nicely with Soviet expansionist foreign policy. The
unfortunate aspect of this solution rests in the relative uncer-
tainty of the prospective market, but I, for one, would look
for an increased sales pitch in the Middle East in the very
near future as a result of any rise in anti-American sentiment
growing out of the Iranian crisis. This area is potentially
one of the largest sources of foreign exchange available to
them.
To recap briefly, the Soviet economic planners have his-
torically been able to maintain enormously high levels of
investment through forced savings imposed on the average con-
sumer, and massive inputs of labor. Additionally, through
long-term credits and a favorable accumulation of foreign ex-
change largely as a derivative of oil and gas exports, the
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USSR has been able to acquire enough sophisticated Western
technology to keep generally competitive in certain indus-
tries. This formula has worked with unquestionable success
for the past 6 3 years of Soviet rule but has come under seri-
ous strains in the 1970*s that foretell of potentially disas-
trous problems for the 19 80's and beyond. The possible solu-
tions to these problems are apparently unsavory to the present
leadership to such an extent that they have elected to adopt
a do-nothing policy, a quite rational decision for them given
the political implications of any change in policy and the
fact that they are all very old men who are unlikely to be in
the position in the coming years of being forced to make the
decision. The essence of the problem can best be summarized
by a series of questions posed by the CIA.
The first concerns the ability of the military to accept
a significant reduction in expenditures in accordance with
the decline in economic growth. Given that this may not mani-
fest itself until after Secretary Brezhnev (and very probably
several others) have passed from the scene and bearing in mind
the significant power of the military within the Soviet sys-
tem, I do not expect any contender for power to select an op-
tion so obviously detrimental to his cause. Additionally,
and as I have already alluded to, it is quite probable that
in recent years the ministerial technocrats have supplanted
the KGB as the third variable in the power lever equation in-
volving the Party and the military. These individuals, among
whom is the author of the anti-consumerism article mentioned
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earlier, obviously would not consider it within their organi-
zational interests to support any reduction in military ex-
penditure. Finally, one of the traditional supports of legiti-
macy for any leadership structure since Lenin has been the
constant display and reference to awesome military might.
Secondly, will the Soviet consumer accept a very modest
increase, or perhaps even a decrease, in his still meager liv-
ing standard? The response to this question must be answered
in historical terms. The Soviet consumer has traditionally
"suffered" in the overall quality of life sector and, at least
in my opinion, it has become a part of his culture in much the
same way that a television and two cars have become part of
ours. Given the absolute control of the media as a second
part of the culture, and, therefore, the ability to manipulate
the population, outside stimuli will be applied in such a man-
ner as to rally support for any policy. Finally, there are
very few options available in the event the consumer is
dissatisfied.
Probably the most difficult to answer, however, is the
question concerning East European willingness to remain con-
tent with supplying the Soviets with their highest quality
capital goods and consumer items in return for a declining
supply of oil and gas? With the Czechoslovak intervention
and the Brezhnev Doctrine so fresh in their mind, combined
with the continued build-up of military forces within the




Clearly then, the reactionary policy shifts that have
been indicative of past succession periods will not become
an immediately operational facet of the new regime so far as
economic reform is concerned. Perhaps Alec Nove summarizes
it best when he states that, "unless one of Brezhnev's suc-
cessors deliberately nails the flag of radical reform to his
mast, the strong combination of state planners, ministerial
officials, Central Committee and regional party officials,
the military-industrial complex and the hardline ideologists
31
will be much too powerful, and conservatism will win."
Unfortunately, I would suggest that no successor would be
capable, at least in the immediate future, of bringing about
economic reform even if he did deliberately take that posi-
tion. The most likely outcome of such a stance would be the
rather swift removal of such an individual from contention.
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VI. POST BREZHNEV CONTINGENCIES
"Soviet leaders do not fade away; they die in office/
or so says Seweryn Bialer. But a review of the present
Politburo is the best argument for supporting this statement.
Politburo Voting Members
Yu. V. Andropov 66
L. I, Brezhnev 73
K. U. Chernenko 6 9
V. V. Grishin 66
A. A. Gromyko 71
A. P. Kirilenko 74
A. N. Kosygin 76
D. A. Kunayev 6 8 (This list represents
A. Ya. Pel 'she 81 ages as they are or
G. V. Romanov 57 will be in calendar
V. V. Shcherbitskiy 62 year 1980)
H. A. Suslov 78
N. A. Tikhonov 75
O. F. Ustinov 72
It is readily apparent from the above list that, with the
sole exception of Romanov, and perhaps Shcherbitskiy, the
remainder of the country's top leadershig is far beyond re-
tirement age. Additionally, the second echelon of Politburo
membership, the non-voting members, does not constitute a
fountain of youth by any means. There are, however, some
significant exceptions to the age rule, particularly with
respect to the November 1979 selection of Mikhail S. Gorbachev,
age 49, as a non-voting member.
Politburo Non-Voting Members
G. A. Aliyev 56
P. N. Demichev 61
M. S. Gorbachev 48
V. V. Kuznetsov 78
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P. M. Masherov 61
B. N. Ponomarev 74
S. R. Rashidov 6 2
E. A. Shevardnadze 51
M. S. Solomentsev 66
As Jerry Hough points out in his 19 79 study , "Excluding Brezhnev,
50 percent of the voting Politburo members will be 70 years of
age or older in 1979 , and another 33 percent will be between
65 and 70. Yet, none has given any indication of a desire
2to retire." So it would seem that at least half, and perhaps
more, will not be among the active leaders of the country by
19 85. This assessment is based solely on biological factors
and not on political stimuli, although the combination cer-
tainly is a strong and undeniable undercurrent feeding the
notion of major personnel changes in the near term. This is
further strengthened when one considers Hough's conclusion
that there has been "a gradual re juvenation. . .among the
3
regional party first secretaries." With leadership changes
a very probable outcome in the near future, and given that
there does not appear to be a likely successor, one must con-
struct scenarios based on shakey speculation as to what indi-
viduals or factions will forge the Soviet policies of the 1980*s
and beyond.
First, and perhaps to stress the precariousness of the
present situation, it is important to consider the position
of the present primus inter pares , Brezhnev. As Bialer des-
cribes him, Brezhnev is, "An old man and, according to numer-
ous reliable reports, a very sick man, he has already relinquiched
major portions of duties to associates. He works at reduced
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pace and energy: he exhibits no interest other than to pre-
side over a very stable regime and to try to carry out well-
4
established, if sometimes contradictory, policies." Some
reports have him only working about four hours a day and,
following the invasion of Afghanistan rumors circulated sug-
gesting that he was not even present during the meeting that
finalized that decision. Although this may serve to highlight
the present transitory nature of Brezhnev, the rumor is highly
unlikely when considered in light of his strong performance
at the November Central Committee Plenum and his subsequent
activities. It would appear that while he may be old and in
poor health, he has clearly maintained his position within the
leadership. How long this situation can or will last remains
to be seen, but it may very well be that the succession process
has already begun.
Within the present hierarchy, there is a generally accepted
scenario that solves the problem of Brezhnev's passing by way
of death, in the near future. This scenario surrounds the
present party secretary for organizational affairs, Andrei
Kirilenko. Several sources have indicated that Kirilenko is
a likely candidate and recent evidence certainly supports this
possibility. The keynote speech at the 6 2nd Anniversary of
5
the revolution in November 1979 was given by Kirilenko and
it was him who led the welcoming delegation for the visiting
g
leaders of the Nicaraguan government in March of this year.
Additionally, Kirilenko spoke for the Kremlin at the March
19 80 meeting of the Hungarian Communist Party in Budapest.
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Further, Myron Rush points out that, "Kirilenko is the only
senior figure who is a member of both the Politburo and the
Secretariat, and he is also ambitious and relatively vigor-
o
ous . " Finally, he has been politically astute enough to
avoid any policies or programs which would serve to alienate
him from those powerful interest groups which I have mentioned
earlier. In his 19 80 Republic Supreme Soviet election cam-
paign speeches he, "displayed his characteristic bias toward
heavy industry (but) avoided use of language denoting contro-
9
versy" such as the "leading role" of heavy industry or "pre-
ferential" development of consumer goods. However, along with
Suslov, he made the strongest statements concerning the con-
tinuation of high defense spending by saying, "we are strength-
ening and will continue to strengthen" Soviet defenses
.
The problem with Kirilenko, however, is twofold. First,
and foremost, is the question of his age. At this writing,
he is 73 and although he is "relatively vigorous" as Rush
suggests, it is difficult to visualize him as having the time
in which to consolidate his position, particularly in lieu of
the other variables operating within the party and Soviet
society as a whole. Secondly, although one does not know for
sure, Kirilenko has traditionally been associated as a protege
of Brezhnev and, therefore, the linkage may prove an insur-
mountable liability with Brezhnev's departure. In any case,
I am forced to agree with William Hy land's assessment that,
"It is difficult to visualize him as the leader for more than
130

a few years." More specifically, I would put his term of
office, assuming he is elected to the position of General
Secretary, at no more than two years and probably less.
There is a second likely candidate, K.U. Chernenko, who
has been named as a possible interim successor but who has
also been labeled as a Brezhnev protege. Although attempts
appear to have been made to downgrade his position within the
leadership (in 19 79 he had been scheduled in the fifth most
prestigious position in the delivering of Supreme Soviet elec-
tion speeches, whereas in 1980, Gromyko and Kunayev were
12placed in front of him moving him to seventh position) , ' most
sources still rank him as a potential successor. Unfortunately
for Chernenko, it appears as though he has become associated
with the moderate faction within the Politburo and has coun-
seled moderation in foreign policy. As one source reports
concerning speeches addressed to the Soviet Republican legis-
latures, "Equally interesting was (Brezhnev's) protege
Konstantin Cherenko's suggestion that things might be worse
if Soviet hotheads had their way. 'In the present difficult
situation, it is important to maintain a steady and cool
head,' he said. 'Aggressive forces would like very much to
provoke us into retaliatory toughness.' He meant aggressive
forces in the West, but domestic implications were also
13
clear." I refer to this situation as unfortunate because
his stance appears to place him in opposition to those forces
that currently possess the most influence. The result seems
to be that Chernenko, without Brezhnev, has no base from
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which to launch his bid and must surely lose in a struggle
with a so-called "hardline" opponent.
To be sure, there are others within the Politburo member-
ship who represent potential successors to Brezhnev, and not
simply in the short run. Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky is young
enough, 6 2 years old at this writing, but he has the decided
disadvantage of being a non-Russian (10 of 14 Politburo mem-
bers are Russian) . Combine this with his lack of a secure
base within the central hierarchy and his credibility rapidly
deteriorates. But perhaps the most significant of the younger
members of the Politburo is Leningrad Party Chief, Grigory V.
Romanov, 57. Unfortunately, it is precisely because he is
so much younger than his colleagues that he may be denied the
top position. As in the past, the most dynamic and likely
candidate may represent a cause for alarm within the ruling
elite, thus unifying them against him. In the case of Romanov,
his extraordinary selection for Politburo membership in March,
19 76 caused many to speculate that he was on his way up and
14
even to figure him as a possible successor to Brezhnev.
However, it was generally conceded that although he was
clearly on his way up, he would have to move to Moscow and
acquire the necessary political connections and support in
that city before he could seriously be considered as a poten-
tial general secretary. Four years later Romanov is still in
Leningrad. Should Brezhnev die within the next few months,
Romanov would have to move quickly to Moscow to begin the
campaigning necessary to secure his position. Based on
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traditional historical factors, however, I see both his move
to Moscow and any subsequent attempt to secure the top posi-
tion as unlikely. His well publicized potential, his age,
15
and his personal demeanor, coupled with a dramatic move to
Moscow may very well prove so threatening to other, more se-
curely based Politburo members, that he may, in fact, face
a radical reversal of his political fortunes
.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it appears as
though he has become associated with some form of economic
reform that may place him at odds with the defense related
interest groups. In a Supreme Soviet election campaign speech
of 7 February, Romanov listed "the need to divert significant
funds to defense needs among several reasons for the failure
of the Soviet economy to expand at a greater rate in recent
16years." He has always been associated, at least in the
western press, as being supportive of economic reform and
decentralization and this characteristic may likely prove to
be among his liabilities.
All of this is not to say that there is a total lack of
potential long-term successors within the 50 to 60 year old
age group. In general, the data is extremely scanty with re-
gard to any individuals not part of the Politburo, but at
least two names have appeared in the literature that have
significant possibilities.
There is, to be sure, a second political organ within the
Party hierarchy which has traditionally been associated with
the reins of power. This organ, the Central Committee
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Secretariat, provides an ambitious individual the vehicle
to acquire the necessary political currency to realistically
purchase a seat at the pinnacle of power. If, for example,
Romanov was to be appointed the Party Secretary for Defense
Industry, his position within the leadership would be enor-
mously enhanced. There are/were two individuals whose status
within the secretariat, combined with their age and apparent
past performance placed them in the position of men on the
way up. These two were singled out by Dmitri Simes in his
1979 study. "Due to such factors as age or career handicaps,
only three of the secretaries have a good chance for further
promotion. Two—Yakov P. Ryabov, and Vladmir I. Dolgikh , . .
.
are respectively in charge of the defense and heavy indus-
17tries..." (the third is Mikhail V. Zimyamn who is 66 and
a Byelorussian) . The latter of the two, Dolgikh, represents
what appears to be an excellent example of the "new class" of
Soviet officialdom. Thathehas been singled out by several
scholars as a man to watch is underlined by statements made
by T.H. Rigby and Grey Hodnett. Rigby has this to say,
"Brezhaev's appointment. . .of V.l. Dolgikh as first secretary
of the Krosnoyarsk Kraikom in 1969 (is) an example of unusually
rapid promotion, and (he) soon moved on to (a) more senior
18
position in the Central Committee Secretariat." Hodnett,
in referring to Dolgikh, stated that, Dolgikh* s most distinc-
tive attributes are his strong Siberian roots, graduate level
education, and extensive leadership experience at the important
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Norilsk Mining-Metalurgical Combine. Dolgikh moved directly
from the directorship of the Combine to the First Secretary
of the Party Committee of Krasnoiarsky Kray in April 1969—
the only party (or indeed political) job he ever held before
19being elevated to the Secretariat." If Dolgikh is ambi-
tious, and his background suggests that he is, his job within
the Secretariat may have enabled him to acquire valuable con-
nections within the powerful military-industrial complex.
Although his absence from the Politburo takes him out of
immediate contention for the position of General Secretary,
a move to that body following the death of Brezhnev and (or)
several others would make him a very powerful possibility.
That Dolgikh' s political fortunes have continued to rise in
recent months is stressed by the fact thatin early May of this
year (1980) the critical new plan surrounding the oil inten-
20
sification drive in Siberia was placed under his direction.
If he should be successful and make significant progress
toward raising oil production, his credibility will be enor-
mously enhanced. His only liability may come as a result of
his inability to appear politically conservative enough during
the initial period of the power struggle. Should he make a
dramatic move too soon, he will unite his colleagues against
him and he will fail.
Yakov P. Ryabov, now 52, was formerly a member of the
secretariat until his move to the government structure in
February, 19 79. The key element surrounding his potential is
not merely the fact that he is a career party apparatchik who
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as Simes points out, rose "through the ranks of the Sverdlosk
21party machine," but also the fact that his job within the
Secretariat placed him in charge of defense industries. Thus
he, too, has been able to forge potentially favorable connec-
tions within that powerful interest group. However, his re-
moval from the Secretariat and appointment as First Deputy
Chairman of the State Planning Committee has been taken by
22
some as a step down. Although any break from a direct link
with the party certainly cannot strengthen one's political
power, it must be kept in mind that Brezhnev suffered a simi-
lar, albeit more prestigious, fate in 1961. Additionally,
it was reported at the time that Ryabov had been placed in
the position as a "trouble-shooter" in that there was a
23
"necessity of further strengthening the key economic agency."
If Ryabov is elevated to the Politburo but remains in the
governmental bureaucracy it should be kept in mind that, as
I mentioned earlier, the new constitution places the military
under state rather than party, supervision. If Ryabov' s con-
nections are significant as a result of his time as defense
industries chief, he could become a formidable opponent. To
be sure, there are some who maintain thatthe government is
less a factor in the future power struggle than it was follow-
ing the death of Stalin. "The Soviet government ... is a weak
base from which to attempt to gain supreme power... tit) seems
less likely to play a major role in the post-Brezhnev settlement
than was the case in 1953-55. This is because in recent years
Party intervention in the execution of policy by the government
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24has become more blatant. Ryabov is a party apparatchik,
however, and it would seem that if he is not forced to remain
for an extended period as a member of the governmental struc-
ture, the experience he gains may be extremely significant.
The picture that develops as a result of the scanty
evidence that is available suggests a form of systemic
arterioscleroses that is the product of longterm trends within
Soviet society. Certainly this is not to say that these trends
have resulted in a permanent gerontocratic political structure
that is so firmly established as to preclude the emergence of
massive dynamic changes. In fact, historical evidence seems
to support the thesis that new Soviet regimes are character-
istically associated with policy shifts that are radically
different than those pursued by previous leaders. Indications
are that the post-Brezhnev period will be no different. Un-
fortunately, what the Brezhnev period has been associated
with, particularly on the domestic front, is stability, con-
servatism and lack of intiative . Seweryn Bialer sums it up
rather nicely by stating, "One has the definite impression
that Soviet policies in the last five years have been char-
acterized by drift, that the Brezhnev leadership has settled
into an ossified mode of continuity, of middle-of-the-road
responsiveness to diverse elite pressure, with no major
25initiatives of its own." That Bialer wrote that prior to
the Afghanistan invasion highlights the possibility that the
succession struggle may already have begun and that the domes-
tic conservation of the 19 70's has led to an increase of
13 7

international adventurism in the 19 80's. The Czechoslovak
intervention came at a time when Brezhnev was not clearly
primus inter pares and, therefore, could ill afford an open
break with the powerful military constituency. In 1980, there
is at least outwardly no question as to who is in control,
but western analysts have been greatly fooled before. Recent
evidence points toward an inexplicable shift in the profile
of the Soviet leadership which tends to support the notion
that pressure is being brought to bear from some quarter. One
source reported that the shake-up of the technology branch of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the wake of Sakharov's re-
moval, "stands for the further hardening of the regime..."
Additionally, George Kennan recently speculated that there has
been a "breakthrough to positions of dominant influence of
hardline elements much less concerned with world public opinion
27but also much less experienced than these (two) older figures."
(Brezhnev and Kosygin) . The identity of these "hardline ele-
ments" remains somewhat a mystery although many suspect such
individuals as Suslov, Ustinov, Marshal Kulikov and Adm.
Gorshkov. However, these men can hardly be called inexperienced
and I suspect they represent only the fountainhead of the pres-
sures operational within the organizations they head or consti-
tuencies they represent. The military, as was pointed out,
has undergone an enormous rejuvenation, and the "new class"
of officer may have reached a point where his voice is being
heard. In a recent interview, Walter Connor described those
younger members of the Soviet elite with whom he had come in
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contact as being very self assured, cosmopolitan and in some
ways arrogant. It is these individuals who will take over
from the caretaker regime, the most likely circumstance were
Brezhnev to die within the next few months to a year. Perhaps
men such as Ryabov, Dolgikh and Romanov represent the new wave
and as such suggest a strengthening of the ties with the mili-
tary-industrial complex. They will inherit a powerful mili-
tary force, virtually unrivaled by any other force on earth.
Should Afghanistan be smoothly and efficiently quieted, as
recent reports seem to indicate, then in the words of William
Hyland, "...when the Brezhnev group retires from the scene,
it may be succeeded by people who see interventionism as the
norm, who believe that the Soviet Union can intervene in ways
28that earlier appeared quite risky indeed."
Most of all, it would appear that the initial conservatism,
an essential period during which the new leader forges new
and stronger links with the most powerful and dangerous
groups, will be followed by "a period of innovation and ex-
29perimentation." The content of this experimentation can
only be the result of pure speculation but, one cannot deny
that growing military strength, the emerging characteristics
of the "new class," and recent policy trends at a time when
Brezhnev's control is at least partially questionable, posit




VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY
As we have seen from the preceeding chapters, the Soviet
sub-elite is becoming a great deal more professional in terms
of their education and job orientation. Gone is the need to
be a great and inspired communist able to interpret Marxism-
Leninism with a clarity unrivaled by other mere mortals. The
new Soviet man is much more pragmatic, much more practical.
He is just as competitive as always but sees not an ideologi-
cal competition but one centered on power. He is, to be sure,
more professional in some ways, and a great deal less in
others. His rise within the bureaucracy has been relatively
circumscribed by the needs of the system, resulting in an
enormous deficit in practical foreign policy experience. This
situation is even further exacerbated by the closed nature of
Soviet society. When the caretaker regime, headed by those
members of the older generation to whom the reins of power
will initially be entrusted, itself passes from the scene, the
world will be confronted by perhaps the most inexperienced
foreign policy-makers ever to control a global power. The
result could very well be the most alarming threat to U.S. sur-
vival ever contemplated. However, that period during which
Soviet interests may be reflected inward as a result of the
inevitable struggle for supremacy, offers a unique opportunity
for U.S. initiatives to perhaps effect the outcome of the
struggle or, failing that, to "educate" the new class of Soviet
140

leader on all the ramifications of international relations.
As T.H. Rigby suggests, "...it can be shown historically that
at times when the Soviet leadership has been an oligarchy
without one member clearly dominant over the others, policy-
making has tended to be slow, indecisive and contradictory."
If one accepts the premise that an internationally threatening
and aggressive Soviet Union is incompatible to a stable world
order as defined by U.S. values and that this situation en-
dangers the very survival of the republic in its present form,
then composition and perceptions of future Soviet leadership
is of primary national concern. With this in mind, a syste-
matic evaluation of contemporary Soviet diplomacy may yield
valuable insight into what tactics may be useful in the future
Additionally, lessons drawn from previous mistakes, both
Soviet and U.S., may very well be applicable to future diplo-
matic interactions.
While it may be true that the "new Soviet elite" differs
significantly from the septogenarians presently in power,
there are certain characteristic Soviet diplomatic varia-
bles that will continue for some time.
Diplomacy and negotiations are effective instru-
ments in seeking international accommodation and
stability, but the central element that determines
their effectiveness is the existing balance of
power. For the reality of power is the first
principle in relations between nations , and
diplomacy is but a reflection of that reality.
Leverage is the vital element in negotiations,
and power the fulcrum upon which it rests.
The Soviets have a traditional respect for
power, and the principle upon which Soviet for-
eign policy is based is a power principle; namely,
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the correlation of forces, or in Western terms, the
balance of power .
2
Specifically with regard to the new generation of Soviet
leadership, Dimitri Simes had this to say concerning power as
a foreign policy variable. "They (the new generation) know
the reality of Soviet power as they are now experiencing it.
But they take a more pragmatic, power-oriented look at inter-
national relations; they are less ideological in approach.
3They see the United States more as a rival superpower..."
What is disconcerting about this analysis is the self-assurance
on the part of the new generation that they "know" what Soviet
power represents. The problem, particularly for the United
States, is that Soviet power is not only a factor of its own
quantity and quality, but it is this as a perception of its
relation to the United States. Should the perception of
strength outstrip the reality, the danger of miscalculation
is significantly enhanced. Again, in terms of our most vital
interest, that of survival, U.S. strength must be clearly
understood. This is even further underlined when one con-
siders that, as Joseph Whelan states, "Implied in this re-
spect for power, applicable at all levels of negotiations, is
recognition of its leverage as a central element in any nego-




It might be well to consider here that when the present
leadership assumed control of the Soviet Union, the power
equation between the two states, U .S ,-U.S .S .R. , was considerably
14 2

different. That U.S. response to Soviet foreign policy
initiatives was a primary concern during the early part of
the present regime has been clearly documented. The situa-
tion in the next decade, when the new generation is resolving
the leadership problem, is considerably different. From the
early 1970 's, Brezhnev and others of the leadership have con-
stantly reiterated the thesis that there has been a funda-
mental shift in the correlation of forces in favor of the
socialist camp. Given the restricted nature of the flow of
information within the society, there can be little doubt as
to the impact this repetition has had on the potential suc-
cessors. Additionally, the Soviets have apparently developed
a rather simple definition for determining the nature of the
power equation. According to Whelan, "The vital center (of
Soviet diplomacy) is a determination of what they call, 'the
correlation of forces-' meaning not just military power, but
the total aggregate of power: military, political, economic
and social. Paramount, however, is the amassing of military
power . " As we have seen, the military is an important varia-
ble on the Soviet domestic political scene and, therefore, it
may be safe to extrapolate that influence to foreign policy-
making. The importance of this influence is underscored not
only by the apparent increase in the potential for a marriage
of interests between the two most powerful groups, the party
and the military, in the upcoming succession, but by tradi-
tional Russian fears that make this marriage all the more
dangerous. As General Samuel Wilson, former head of the
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Defense Intelligence Agency and a specialist in Soviet affairs
who had extensive tours of duty in Moscow, states, "the Soviets
will never feel comfortable until they have a ratio in strength
of 7 or 8:1. They might relax," he said, "if it were 15:1.
"
7
Further, as William Husband emphatically states, "Reduced to
barest essentials, the Soviet's perceive positions -of-strength
g
as ' positions-of-superior-strength. " For our part, superior
strength implies a degree of danger to our continued present
existence so intense that such an imbalance would be tanta-
moutn to a withdrawal from the competition.
A second characteristic which may very likely continue
into the next generation of Soviet leadership concerns a
communist repugnance for a very American political tool, com-
promise. This characteristic is perhaps best described by
John Wadsworth in his 196 2 study. "To a Western nation, the
basic purpose is to reach an agreement by compromise. To
Communists, at least to date, negotiation is part of a grand
strategy aimed at the eventual total defeat of the other side.
They may negotiate with no intention whatever of reaching
9
agreement except on their proposals." This may be more easily
understood by considering the historical and geographical varia-
bles that have molded the Russian psyche. These variables and
their impact led George Kennan to surmise that the Russians,
"have no concept of permanent friendly relations between
states... For them, all foreigners are potential enemies."
What is important to remember is that, although communist
ideology has perhaps become less of an active political
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variable within Soviet society- it still remains the only
form of legitimization for the regime. Therefore, when com-
bined with the xenophobic nature described above, it is
impossible to foresee a "live-and-let-live" international
situation arising from the new leadership.
In a purely practical sense then, one can expect the next
generation of Soviet leaders to use those diplomatic tools
which offer the highest returns and which, just as productive
technology, represent the latest proven capability. With
this in mind it may do well to consider those tools which
have recently worked so well.
In the 1977 Soviet publication, A Short Dictionary-Reference
Book for Agitators and Political Information Officers , a basic
ideological concept, peaceful coexistence, is defined. In
this definition specific reference is made to communist inter-
action with other social systems and it is extremely impor-
tant for U.S. interests not to overlook the significance of
this definition. In part it states that, "Peaceful coexistence
does not extend to the class (struggle), and consequently, (does
not) extend to the ideological struggle of the two systems.
In the struggle of the two world views (communism and capital-
ism) there cannot be a place for neutralism and compromise."
Additionally, the basic restatement of the principle of peace-
ful coexistence by the present Soviet leadership is contained
in the "Thesis of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist
Party" published December 23, 1969. In part it stated:
145

Lenin pointed out (that) peaceful coexistence
between states with differing social systems
presupposes an acute political, economic and
ideological struggle between socialism and
capitalism, between the working class and
bourgeoisie. Peaceful coexistence has nothing
in common with class peace and does not cast
even the slightest doubt upon the opporessed
peoples' sacred right to use all means, in-
cluding armed struggle, in the cause of their
liberation. 12
From the standpoint of our very survival, it seems clearly
essential that we understand the definition and establish
a coherent ideological platform of our own. Perhaps Graham
Vernon summarizes it best when he states,
Far better, it would seem, if the United States
were to understand peaceful coexistence as the
Soviets do: as a possible means of averting
nuclear war. Such an understanding, however,
must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the
Soviet Union is fundamentally hostile to the
United States, and that a return to the open
hostility of the Cold War is better than risk-
ing the security of the United States through
disadvantageous agreements . Peaceful co-
existence is not friendship. 13
It is precisely because there is an apparent lack on the part
of many Western leaders to fully appreciate the Soviet defini-
tion of the term that this policy has been so successful in
the past and can therefore be expected to be vigorously pur-
sued in the future. In the zero-sum game of the Soviet politi-
cal scene, anything that can be successfully used to lull an
opponent into a lack of vigilance will be utilized.
The second diplomatic tool that has been successfully used,
particularly by Brezhnev, is that of detente. Again, the
definition presented in the 1977 Soviet agitator's dictionary
is important to consider. "(Detente) is connected first of
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all with the changes in the correlation of forces in the world
in favor of communism. Detente is a result of the steady in-
crease in the strength and power of socialism, (of) the growth
of its influence and authority in the international arena."
The fact that this theme has been constantly repeated in
Soviet literature and speeches throughout the past decade has
unquestionably had an influence in the Soviet sub-elite. The
exact manifestation that this influence will take cannot yet
be known for certain but if one is told that the correlation
of forces has changed in one's favor, it would indeed be un-
realistic to consider any reversal in those forces
—
particularly
during the course of a struggle for internal power supremacy.
In 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger suggested four prin-
ciples to guide the course of the United States along the
detente path. To be sure, there appear to be fundamental
differences in the approach taken by Dr. Kissinger and that
of the Soviet dictionary.
First, Dr. Kissinger maintains that, "if detente is to
15
endure, both sides must benefit." From what has been pre-
sented concerning Soviet abilities to compromise and the
general Soviet paranoia surrounding relations with foreign
countries, it seems unlikely that they would be willing to
see any benefit accrue to their foremost rival. As in Soviet
domestic struggles, the greatest threat must be crushed.





Dr. Kissinger went on to say that building a new rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union does not entail any devaluation
of traditional alliance relationships and that the emergence
of more normal relations with the USSR must not undermine our
resolve to maintain our national defense. Six years later
it would seem fairly clear that those principles have indeed
been violated. The strongest evidence to support that thesis
ironically comes from the Soviets who, in recent months, have
steadfastly maintained that detente may be salvaged, and seem
1 fiquite sincere in this advocacy. To be sure, there is, ac-
cording to Robert Conquest, a simple and rather straightfor-
ward reason as to why the Soviets, at least the present regime,
favor detente. "The reason that Brezhnev and the rest of them
are happy with detente is because they are getting everything
17they want without having to pursue a 'hard 1 policy." The
question, of course, is whether the sub-elite appreciate the
gains that detente has obtained for the Soviet Union. If, as
I have suggested, there is a growing pragmatism and bureau-
cratic professionalism among this group combined with a general
lack of experience in foreign affairs, the chances are that
detente will not be a favorable policy. This is particularly
so during the period in which the new leader is attempting to
forge close political ties with the powerful interest groups.
Self-assuredness and inexperience will very likely prove to
be an extremely dangerous combination. As William Hyland
suggests, "The new leaders might take the harder course if
by then they have managed to shake the sense of historical
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inferiority resulting from the experience of the 193y's and
the war. And some of these people probably have not acquired
the temperance and prudence that Brezhnev and Kosygin learned
18through experience." Perhaps Afghanistan is a direct result
of the self-assurance aspect.
NUCLEAR WAR AND THE PROJECTION OF POWER
If, as I have attempted to show earlier, there is a con-
vergence of views among both the present leadership and the
military and the emerging sub-elite and the military, it is
of particular interest for the United States to understand the
thrust of these views
.
Specifically, although the Soviets are by no means anxious
to engage in a nuclear war, they do not reject the idea of
such a war nor the use of nuclear weapons. In a November 1975
article published in the Soviet journal Communist of the Armed
Forces , the following was stated:
The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a
continuation of policy by military means remains
true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in
military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois
ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons
lead war outside the framework, of policy and that
nuclear war moves beyond the control of policy,
ceases to be an instrument of policy and does not
constitute its continuation is theoretically in-
correct and politically reactionary.... The des-
cription of the correlation between war and policy
is fully valid for the use of weapons of mass
destruction. Far from leading to a lessening of
the role of policy in waging war, the tremendous
might of the means of destruction leads to the
raising of that role. After all, immeasurably
more effective means of struggle are now at the
direct disposal of state power. 19
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Additionally, with regard to the use of theater nuclear
weapons, Soviet military doctrine states that, "the main pur-
pose of offensive combat is the complete destruction of a
defending enemy, and will now be achieved, first of all, by
20
strikes of nuclear weapons...." (It might also be signifi-
cant to note here that the Soviets state, "offensive operations
in a future war will be the basic means for solving the prob-
21 ...lems of armed conflict...." ) This strategy and Soviet civil
defense preparations based on the premise that, "The events
of the past few years have clearly shown that the imperialist
camp, led by the United States of America, is preparing to
commit a most dangerous crime against humanity— a world war
22
using weapons of mass destruction," clearly are inconsistent
with our own worldview.
However, not only is Soviet military strategy offensively
oriented, this aggressiveness has carried over to the diplo-
matic sphere. As F.D. Kohler states, "By 1969, Foreign Minis-
ter Gromyko was authorized to state the basic thesis; 'The
Soviet Union, which, as a large world power, has widely
developed international connections, cannot take a passive
attitude toward those events that might be territorially re-
mote but that touch on our security and also on the security
of our friends..." One year later, on March 14, 1970,
Brezhnev was to further state, "At the present time no ques-
tion of any importance in the world can be solved without our




military might." The decade of the 1970' s saw a massive
increase in both the Soviet military establishment and the
projection of that establishment on a global basis in connec-
tion with the above thesis. That this projection of power
was conducted with relative immunity can hardly have been
lost on the emerging new generation of Soviet bureaucrats.
THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
By this point it should be clear that the Soviets are
fierce and aggressive competitors whose stated goals and
objectives seem clearly bent on the domination of all other
political entities. Detente and peaceful coexistence are
simply the present means by which the Soviets avoid nuclear
war and by which they have been able to lull the West into a
misplaced sense of security. In the years ahead, the Soviet
Union will be forced to devote a portion of its energies in-
ward in an attempt to resolve the inevitable problems asso-
ciated with the establishment of a new elite. Traditionally,
this inward reflection has been associated with a general
hardening of policy in an attempt to win the support of strong
conservative interest groups.
It is therefore absolutely essential to the long-term sur-
vival of the United States that a coherent policy vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union be developed. This policy, or strategy, must
be all-encompassing and not simply one aimed at correcting
the imbalance in the military arena. Just as the Soviets have
displayed a willingness to compete in an entire spectrum of
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areas from ideological to economic, our policy should also
be designed to extend into a variety of areas . American
strategy should not, however, be restricted to merely those
areas specifically in jeopardy as a direct result of Soviet
capabilities, but should extend beyond to areas of specific
interest to American values and goals
.
The danger lies in the question of the collective, compe-
titive will. Where the political cost of direct and tangible
action on the part of the U.S. is in question, the problem of
will becomes more complex and more critical. Regarding Viet-
name, William and Harriet Scott make the following assessment;
Vietnam was a watershed for the Soviet Union.
The victory of the North Vietnamese encouraged the
Soviets to believe that the Western democracies
lack the will to stop so-called national libera-
tion movements, especially those backed by the
USSR and the socialist community. "
In 1976, in Angola, the Soviets were further encouraged.
The critical problem is one of training or conditioning, par-
ticularly on the Soviet sub-elite. As Leopold Labedz sug-
gests, "(the next Soviet leadership) may well hope that by
using its increased might it can achieve further political
and strategic advances, if the Western powers continue to dis-
27play cowardice and confusion."
Perhaps one of the best lessons of recent times on how to
effectively deal with the Soviets comes from the personal
recollections of former President Nixon and William Safire
.
According to Safire, "Nixon's way was to appear rigid..."
during the conduct of negotiations and he specifically made a
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point of insuring that the Soviets were informed of his repu-
tation. "I have the reputation of being a hard-line anti-
communist," he said at one of his first Kremlin meetings to
which Kosygin, "who was created to exemplify the adjective
'dour*, cracked his first thin smile of the summit and re-
28plied, 'We know, we know. 1 " The fact is that they did know,
from long experience, just exactly where Nixon stood and this
knowledge helped to reduce the significance of traditional
Russian paranoia.
The lesson to be learned, however, is not so much the
effectiveness of Nixon's style, but the fact that he repre-
sented a known quantity with whom the Soviets had been dealing
for some time. (The famous "kitchen debate" had taken place
13 years earlier, in July, 1959.) Continuity and straight-
forwardness clearly appear to be important attributes of any
strategy contemplated. These two characteristics should per-
haps also be accompanied by clarity, specifically with regard
to the definition of terms . We have already seen what prob-
lems can arise out of such unclear phrases as "peaceful co-
existence" and "detente".
This is not to suggest that American presidents be elected
for ten or fifteen years in order to achieve a continuity
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. There are however alternatives
that, if initiated now, would serve to reduce the problems
of communicating with the Soviets in the future. Specifically





1) Appoint one official within the State De-
partment to oversee all aspects of the
U .S .-U.S .S .R. relationship, i.e., an
Undersecretary of State for Strategic and
Soviet Affairs
.
2) Create a State Department bureau for Soviet
and East European Affairs.
3) Develop a corps of arms control experts with
Soviet experience.
4) Keep our embassy in Moscow fully informed
on key issues.
5) Improve recruitment and training of Soviet
specialists . 29
The essence of his list is to establish and maintain pro-
fessionalism, expertise and continuity. If a permanent corps
of Soviet specialists could be recruited and trained and then
used , there clearly would exist a possibility for establishing
a more meaningful dialogue with the Soviets in that the fear
of the unknown could conceivably be reduced for them. Addi-
tionally, this corps could serve the additional function of
interpreting Soviet policies and programs. Presently this
function is being performed by a series of academicians whose
views are as varied as the institutions from which they come.
They are additionally handicapped by their disassociation with
not only the U.S. government but by a lack of constant inter-
action on a personal level with Soviet governmental personnel.
There is, in fact, a general lack of organization on the part
of the government in its dealings with the most significant
threat to national survival that presently exists
.
In terms of our national survival, which is perhaps the
most important generally agreed upon national interest within
the United States, the Soviet Union presently represents the
single most dangerous external threat. Although, as William
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Hyland suggests, "it is preferable to sort the problems out
now and find out what we are dealing with rather than to
assume that we will be in a better position later because the
Soviets will be in the midst of a succession crisis," the
fact remains that we are in a succession crisis of our own
that precludes any bold new initiative for the immediate future
It is also unlikely that the present Soviet leadership will be
obliging enough to survive long enough for us to resolve the
issue completely. U.S. presidents, as well as Soviet General
Secretaries, require a certain amount of time to consolidate
their positions. The key therefore lies in acknowledgment of
the threat and the establishment of a continuing link not only
in terms of the new Soviet leadership, but within our own
governmental system.
As I have indicated, there is mounting evidence to suggest
that the next generation of Soviet leaders will not be more
conciliatory in its relation with the West. Our policies
therefore should reflect a careful and educated amount of
this evidence. Perhaps the operating code of the U.S. Embassy
in Moscow during the mid-19 80' s is and will be the best solu-
tion. "Firm, patient, persistent, polite." In any event,
it is important to recall that recent words of Soviet leader
Brezhnev, "the entire accumulated experience, the... inter-
national situation, particularly the facts of the recent time,




While no study can predict the future, certain histori-
cal trends can be identified to reduce the risk of U.S. mis-
perceptions and miscalculations during the upcoming Soviet
leadership transition. Historically, Russian political sys-
tems have been conservative, and the present Soviet circum-
stances serve only to underline this fact. Traditional Russian
power variables have remained unchanged, with the one out-
standing difference being the existence of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. Under present circumstances, any
aspirant to the position of General Secretary of the CPSU
must have the support of the Party as a power base before he
can reasonably be considered. To achie\e credibility he must
have performed well at as many of the levels of the Party
hierarchy as possible. It is this background that constitutes
both credibility in the eyes of the rank and file party member-
ship and the beginnings of a political power base from which
to launch a bid for supreme power.
As in medieval Muscovy with the existence of the Streltzy
the military continues to be an extremely important political
factor. The present regime has, in fact, steadily improved
the position of this interest group, serving to further enhance
its importance in the upcoming succession struggle. Close
ties with this powerful group are absolutely essential. Fail-
ure to maintain close ties with the military, poor relations
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with the military, or merely a moderate change in the military's
status quo has proven politically fatal in the past. Any
potential General Secretary must have the continued support
of the military in order to gain and maintain power.
The heavy industrial technocrats constitute an equally
important political interest group. This group, in contrast
to the "Russian" tradition, has become a "traditional" Soviet
power lever which must be considered. Heavy industry, clearly
the most successful aspect of the Soviet economy, continues
to attract the most ambitious and capable people within the
Soviet political system. These individuals have been groomed
for an entire generation to expect preferred treatment from
the government. As in the case of the military, any change
in the status quo would be intolerable and could not be sup-
ported. As Malenkov discovered, the Soviet consumer does not
constitute a political force within Soviet society. Support
of the consumer through the reallocation of resources to light
industry only serves to antagonize two of the three most power-
ful Soviet interest groups; the military and the technocrats.
Further, it must be remembered that the most powerful Party
bureaucrats have, for several years, been heavily associated
with these groups
.
The result is that, as in any large bureaucracy, criteria
emerge by which ambitious individuals gauge their progress to
the highest rungs of the ladder. These criteria are contin-
ually reinforced by the successes of those who have taken
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the "proven" path. In the modern Soviet society, there most
definitely exist such criteria. While certain variables such
as ideology have lost some of their former significance, the
more traditional power supports have remained. As the present
generation of leaders passes from the scene, these "modern
Soviet men" intensively educated in technical matters, closely
associated with heavy industry and defense interests, and
experienced in Party administration—will take charge. The
transition will probably be slow, methodical, and conserva-
tive, lacking any spark of dynamism. It will be marked by
the continued support of the powerful interest groups which
have become historically essential. The average citizen,
worker, consumer and non-party member will have absolutely no
input on the transition. The maturity of the Soviet governmen-
tal system, particularly under the Brezhnev regime, has only
served to ensure a continuation of the status quo. Dramatic
change will only come as a result of catastrophic and improba-
ble events—both internal and external—such as those that
existed in the years immediately preceding 1917. Nonetheless,
U.S. strategic planning must take account of the probable
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